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-1- 
Introduction 
The Uniformed and Overseas Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) guarantees the absentee voting 
rights of members of the armed forces, of their spouses and dependents accompanying them, and 
of civilian citizens residing abroad either temporarily or permanently.
1
 An estimated six million 
voters are covered by the act, including soldiers stationed in Iraq, students, businessmen and 
women working for American or “foreign” firms, missionaries, and embassy personnel.2 
American election campaigns therefore extend beyond U.S. boarders, for overseas votes may be 
significant in close races. The most obvious and extreme example of such a close race is the 2000 
presidential election. As Florida‟s votes were counted in the evening of November 7 that year, it 
became clear that the late overseas ballots that would be arriving during the next ten days could 
determine the winner of Florida‟s electoral votes, and could therefore also determine the winner 
of the Presidency.
3
 On election night, the Democratic nominee Al Gore was leading in the Florida 
election by an edge of 202 votes. When the late arriving UOCAVA ballots were finally counted, 
however, the state swung over to the Republican nominee by an edge of 537 votes, and George 
W. Bush became president.
4
  
 The 2000 presidential election revealed problems with UOCAVA voting procedures. One 
of these problems is caused by transit time, as many voters receive ballots too late for their timely 
                                                 
1
 42 U.S.C. §1973ff through ff-6. 
2
 For the estimate referenced here, see The Federal Voting Assistance Program, Eighteenth Report: 2008 Post 
Election Survey Report, March 2011: ii, http://www.fvap.gov/resources/media/18threport.pdf  accessed July 18, 
2011.No one claims to have an accurate estimate of the civilian overseas population, and therefore no estimate of the 
UOCAVA population as a whole. Some estimates run higher that used by the FVAP, up to seven million. See also 
Taylor Dark III, “Americans Abroad: The Challenge of a Globalized Electorate,” PS: Political Science and Politics, 
vol. 36, no. 4, October 2003:733, www.jstor.org/stable/3649270 accessed June 7, 2010. See also R. Michael Alvarez, 
Thad E. Hall and Brian F. Roberts, Military Voting and the Law: Procedural and Technological solutions to the 
Ballot Transit Problem Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project Working Paper no. 53, California Institute of 
Technology & Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 2007 
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/drupal/files/working_paper/vtp_wp53.pdf accessed June 3, 2011.  
UOCAVA also includes uniformed service personnel on active duty still in the U.S. but absent from the district in 
which they are eligible to vote. No available material specifies the number of such UOCAVA voters. 
3
 See for instance Taylor Dark III, 2003: 733-736. Because Florida forwarded ballots too late for overseas voters to 
be able to return them in time, a consent decree between the Justice Department and Florida required the state to 
count ballots arriving up to ten days after Election Day. See chapter four for further information.  
4
 The process took over a month, however, because of legal disputes concerning recounts. No recounts were held 
after the UOCAVA votes had been counted though. Alvarez et al. 2007: 33-34. 
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return to the various election districts. The election also revealed that in situations like the one in 
Florida, election fraud, or allegations of election fraud, might result from problems with 
UOCAVA voting. A study conducted by The New York Times, for instance, revealed that the 
Bush campaign had successfully encouraged the counting of at least 680 late arriving ballots that 
lacked requirements such as postmarks, signing or dating that would have proved that the ballot 
had been sent before Election Day. Because many of the overseas Floridian ballots belonged to 
members of the Armed Forces, Republicans had believed that they would benefit from these 
ballots (rightfully, as it turned out.) Had the ballots been rejected, Bush‟s margin of victory might 
have shrunk.
5
   
 Congressional efforts to ensure the absentee voting rights of groups now covered by 
UOCAVA began in the 1940‟s. The Soldier Voting Act of 1942 was the first legislation passed 
that required states to provide absentee voting procedures for soldiers fighting in the Second 
World War. In each passing decade, Congress passed new legislation that extended such absentee 
voting rights in congressional and presidential elections to new groups. In 1955, the Federal 
Voting Assistance Act also covered dependents of service members as well as federal employees 
overseas. The act was amended in 1968 to include other civilians temporarily living overseas. In 
1975, Congress passed the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act that finally guaranteed the 
absentee voting rights of all citizens living abroad.
6
 UOCAVA (1986) consolidated and updated 
(and replaced) the existing acts, and still provides the framework for military and overseas voting 
rights today. But, as already indicated, problems persist. In 2009 the Pew Center on the States 
released a report that noted that 25 states and the District of Columbia needed to improve their 
absentee balloting rules by among other things allowing voters more time to request and return 
their ballots.
7
 The same year, the Overseas Vote Foundation published a report that was based on 
the survey results of 24,000 UOCAVA voters and 1,000 local election officials. It found that one 
                                                 
5
 See Dark III, 2003: 738. 
6
 Except for citizens born overseas who have never established residence. Some states allow these citizens to vote in 
the district in which their parents last resided. 
7
 Pew Center on the States, No Time To Vote: Challenges Facing America’s Overseas Military Voters, January 2009, 
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/NTTV_Report_Web.pdf accessed January 3 2011. See also the 
report referenced in Kevin J. Coleman, The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Act: Overview and Issues 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 17, 2011) 13-14, 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20764_20110217.pdf  accessed November 5, 2011.  
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in four respondents did not receive the ballots they had requested (at all.)
8
 As a consequence, 
UOCAVA voting reform continues. Most recently, Obama amended existing legislation in 
October 2009 by signing the Military and Overseas Empowerment Act which Kevin J. Coleman 
describes as a major overhaul of UOCAVA.
9
   
1.1 Research Question and Main Arguments 
The topic of this thesis is the history of public debates concerning U.S. policy towards the 
absentee voting rights of the groups now covered by UOCAVA. More precisely, the central 
research question is: What factors have hindered or encouraged change in U.S. policy concerning 
the absentee voting rights of members of the uniformed services, their spouses and dependents 
accompanying them, and overseas citizens, from the 1940‟s to the present? The thesis also 
addresses the questions of how policy has changed and how successful these changes have been 
at enfranchising these groups of citizens.  
 The thesis discusses a number of factors that have influenced U.S. policy concerning 
absentee voting rights by UOCAVA voters. It is argued that war encouraged progress in the 
voting rights of military voters, just as it has encouraged progress in voting rights in general.
10
 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that the efforts of interest groups of overseas civilians have been 
vital to the extension of absentee voting rights to include such civilians. Some argue that overseas 
civilian voters have in the past met problems because the Federal Voting Assistance Program - 
designated to carry out the federal responsibilities proscribed by UOCAVA - is placed under the 
Department of Defense.
 11
 This thesis, however, argues that overseas civilian voters have at the 
same time profited from being linked to military voters. Congress and the American public are in 
general more concerned with the rights of service people than with the rights of civilians abroad. 
Election reforms directed at military voters will often also benefit the other UOCAVA voters.  
                                                 
8
 Overseas Vote Foundation, 2008 OVF Post Election UOCAVA survey report and analysis, February 2009: 5, 
https://www.overseasvotefoundation.org/files/OVF_2009_PostElectionSurvey_Report.pdf  accessed June 3, 2011. 
9
 Military and Overseas Empowerment Act part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010: P.L. 11-84 
(October 28, 2009) The Move Act is available at http://www.fvap.gov/resources/media/moveact.pdf  see also 
Coleman 2011: 4. 
10
 Alexander Keyssar, The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United State, revised edition 
(New York: Basic Books, 2009) xxiv. See also Pamela S. Karlan, “Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of 
the Right to Vote”, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 71, 2002-2003: 1345-1372. 
11
 See for instance Alix Christie, “Suppressing the Overseas Vote,” guardian.co.uk, October 25, 2004, 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/25/uselections2004.usa2/print accessed May 18, 2010. 
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This thesis argues that issues of states‟ rights and civil rights have significantly influenced 
debates concerning the absentee voting rights of military and overseas citizens. In the 1940‟s, the 
absentee voting bills covering members of the military met fierce opposition, partly because the 
White South feared that their being passed would set a precedent for further federal involvement 
that might enfranchise African Americans.
12
 During the 1960‟s and 1970‟s, restrictions to the 
franchise were removed to such an extent that something close to universal suffrage was 
achieved,
13
 something that eased the way for new legislation enfranchising absent military and 
overseas citizens. Today, amendments to UOCAVA pass without much controversy, and are 
categorized under congressional powers to regulate elections.
14
 
 This thesis also argues that partisan politics have been a significant factor influencing 
U.S. policy debates concerning absentee voting rights of groups now covered by UOCAVA. In 
the 1940‟s, Gallup polls showed that a great majority of soldiers would vote for the Democrats, 
and for their commander-in-chief, Franklin D. Roosevelt.
15
 As a consequence, a great majority of 
Republicans in Congress joined Southern states‟ rights Democrats in opposing bills aimed at 
enfranchising military personnel. However, since at least the 1970‟s, when Congress extended its 
commitment to overseas civilians, both Republicans and Democrats have claimed to have an 
edge in the UOCAVA vote.
16
 For no one knows the exact size or “shape” of the overseas civilian 
population. This thesis argues that this lack of knowledge in voting behavior has helped bills 
amending UOCAVA avoid problems of partisan splits that have hindered many other election 
reform initiatives since the 2000 presidential debacle. 
1.2 Sources 
What makes the thesis original is the fact that the history of U.S. policy debates concerning 
UOCAVA voting rights is not (properly) covered in the academic literature. Boyd A. Martin has 
written one article that discusses the relevant policy debates in 1942 to 1944, published in The 
                                                 
12
 See for instance Lawson Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944-1969 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1976) 75. 
13
 Keyssar 2009: 228. 
14
 See Anthony H. Gamboa, The Scope of Congressional Authority in Election Administration, GOA-01-470 
(Washington D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, March 2001) 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01470.pdf accessed May 2011. 
15
 See for instance George Gallup, “Vote of Soldiers Could Decide ‟44 Election, Gallup Poll Finds,” The New York 
Times, December 5, 1943, available at www.nytimes.com accessed November 4 2010. 
16
 See for instance Dark III 2003: 733. 
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American Political Science Review in 1945.
17
 However, this article is relatively brief, and due to 
the fact that it was written in 1945, it only gives information on a fragment of the history covered 
by this thesis. It also gives an interesting overview of state absentee voting legislation for soldiers 
prior to the 1940‟s, including a comment on Lincoln‟s interest in the issue during the Civil War. 
Another article written by Kenneth M. Davidson published in 1969 in the Buffalo Law Review, 
discusses overseas civilians voting rights.
 18
 However, it is limited to presenting the author‟s own 
legal arguments in support of the constitutionality of federal legislation guaranteeing such rights.  
Scholarly articles concerning the absentee voting rights of UOCAVA citizens began to 
appear after the scandal-ridden 2000 presidential election. Most of these are limited to discussing 
problems facing such voters today and how such problems can be solved. They do not discuss 
policy debates as such, certainly not policy debates in a historical perspective. One exception is 
Military Voting and the Law: Procedural and Technological Solutions to the Ballot Transit 
Problem, by R. Michael Alvarez, Thad Hall, and Brian F. Roberts.
19
 The study is the result of a 
collaborative research effort between the California Institute of Technology and Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, called Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project. The project was 
established in December 2000 to provide studies that would help solve problems like those that 
threatened the 2000 presidential election.
20
 Military Voting and the Law provides a historical 
perspective on the voting rights of UOCAVA citizens. For instance, it includes a discussion of 
policy debates in the 1940‟s and 1950‟s, however, this discussion is much briefer than the one 
provided in this thesis. It does not, for instance, discuss the influence that Roosevelt‟s personal 
involvement had on debates. The study does not cover policy debates during the 1960‟s and 
1970‟s concerning overseas voting rights of civilians, or the role of overseas interest groups in 
influencing Congress. In contrast, the second of this thesis‟ three main content chapters is 
devoted to those decades and those efforts. The study by Alvarez, Hall and Roberts, not 
surprisingly, focuses on the technicalities in voting procedures. The study‟s presentation of policy 
debates during the two recent decades in particular, is mostly limited to a discussion of different 
technology options that have been experimented with. Furthermore, the study was conducted in 
2007, and does therefore not cover the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act 
                                                 
17
 Boyd A. Martin, “The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944”, The American Political Science Review, vol. 39, no. 
4, August, 1945: 720-732. 
18
 Kenneth M. Davidson, “Voting Rights of Americans Abroad,” Buffalo Law Review, vol. 18, 1968-1969: 469-488. 
19
 Alvarez et al. 2007. 
20
 For information on the Caltech/MIT project, see http://vote.caltech.edu/drupal/   
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of 2010 that has been described as “a major overhaul” of UOCAVA.21 The study has, however, 
been particularly useful for this thesis in explaining UOCAVA‟s relevance to the 2000 election 
debacle.  
Another study that has been written as part of the Caltech/MIT Voting Technology 
Project is Thad E. Hall‟s UOCAVA: A state of Research.22 Hall maintains that there is very little 
quality research on UOCAVA voting. “Understanding the problems that are faced by the 
UOCAVA population is difficult because these groups have not been a common population to 
study. Studies of general population voting behavior, turnout, and election administration have 
typically not included overseas civilians, military personnel, and their dependents.”23 He 
criticizes the Federal Voting Assistance Program‟s mandated study of UOCAVA voting behavior 
for not releasing its survey methodology or raw survey data to policy makers or to scholars. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to know if surveys are based on representative samples, as the size and 
“shape” of overseas civilians is not known, he argues. Hall finds the Election Commission‟s 
reports on UOCAVA to be more interesting, as they are based on data drawn from the states, not 
from survey samples from UOCAVA voters. However, even these data are limited, he argues, 
because not all states collected the data that UOCAVA requires.
24
 While the situation might have 
improved since Hall wrote his study in 2008, the amendments passed in 2009 (the MOVE Act) 
includes a requirement that the Federal Voting Assistance Program, in cooperation with the 
Election Assistance Commission and the chief state election official of each state, shall develop 
standards for states to report on UOCAVA ballot data.
25
 This might indicate that problems 
remain. In any case, the lack of representative information on absentee voting experience by 
groups covered by UOCAVA makes it difficult to evaluate exactly how effective federal reforms 
to improve the absentee voting rights of these groups have been over time. This thesis, however, 
references reports and surveys available online, but does so to indicate continued problems or 
improvements, rather than as evidence of progress (as percentage improvements.)  
                                                 
21
 Kevin J. Coleman, “Voting for the Armed Forces and Citizens Abroad,” unpublished paper from 2005, provided 
by Coleman through the American Embassy in Oslo, June 4, 2010. 
22
 Thad E. Hall, UOCAVA: A State of Research, Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project Working Paper no. 69, 
September 15, 2008 http://vote.caltech.edu/drupal/files/working_paper/WP_69.pdf  accessed June 3, 2011. 
23
 Hall 2008: ii. 
24
 Hall 2008: iii, 6. 
25
 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Section 101 (b) 11. Available at 
www.fvap.gov/resources/media/uocavalaw.pdf  accessed July 5, 2010.  DAVID: I still don‟t understand how to 
reference laws. “P.L. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924-929 (August 28, 1986) 
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Kevin J. Coleman, election analyst of the Congressional Research Service, provides a 
useful report that gives an overview of the relevant acts passed since 1942, with summaries of the 
most significant provisions of recent amendments to UOCAVA. In addition, the American 
Embassy in Oslo has provided an unpublished report authored by Coleman. This report provides 
nearly the same information as the latter one, but contains a more detailed historical outline of 
congressional action through the decades, including references to hearings and bills introduced in 
Congress. Neither report provides information on policy discussions, but they have both been 
very useful as guides indicating what government documents to look for.
26
 
 Alexander Keyssar‟s The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the 
United States, does not discuss voting rights of overseas civilians at all, although it does in a few 
paragraphs discuss federal military voting legislation during the Second World War.
27
 However, 
the book is one of the main sources used for background information on the progress in voting 
rights in general during the decades covered by this thesis, and for information on public policy 
discussions concerning election reform in general after the 2000 presidential election. It is 
however important to note that Keyssar is liberal in outlook, and that this might shine through 
especially in his analysis of the post-2000 election reform debates where he might be slightly 
biased in favor of Democratic efforts. Steven F. Lawson‟s Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the 
South, 1944-1969 has also been used for information explaining the link between the soldier 
voting debates and civil rights issues.
28
    
Due to the scarcity of academic writing on the history of UOCAVA policy, the thesis 
relies heavily on primary sources. These include congressional hearings to which are attached a 
variety of documents such as the texts of court cases, brochures for overseas voters, and letters 
written by the Justice Department; congressional records showing House floor debates; 
congressional reports that accompany bills (which include minority views); and websites of 
various interest groups (for instance to see what reforms they have lobbied for and to see their 
evaluation of new UOCAVA reforms.)  The thesis also discusses the text of the acts themselves 
as well as proposed bills. Understanding the law texts and the text of judicial rulings can be 
difficult for a non-law student. However, the interpretation of law is an issue that will be 
                                                 
26
 Coleman 2005, and Coleman 2011. 
27
 Keyssar 2009: 197. 
28
 Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944-1969 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1976). 
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discussed in it own right. As the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights were passed, for 
instance, overseas voting activists believed they had gained the right to vote absentee at least for 
president, as this was provided for the general population by these amendments. The Justice 
Department and the states did not interpret the amendments as including overseas citizens, 
however.
29
 Thus, when discussing acts and the text of judicial rulings, the focus is placed on how 
they have been interpreted by the various parties involved. When presenting the more straight-
forward provisions of the acts, this is done by double checking with sources like Coleman‟s 
Congressional Research Service report (that outline the key changes made to the law.)
30
  
 The thesis also relies heavily on newspaper articles from all the relevant decades, both as 
primary and secondary sources. George Gallup, for instance, presented his opinion polls in 
articles he wrote himself in The New York Times, that serve as primary sources since these polls 
and articles undoubtedly influenced the policy choices of the parties in Congress.
31
 Points of view 
of different articles have also been included in thesis. As secondary sources, newspaper articles 
have been helpful for their information on developments in Congress, and have been checked 
against official documents whenever possible. The newspaper that is most heavily relied on is 
The New York Times, simply because it has an extensive online archive that is “user-friendly” and 
that covers the 1940‟s (in addition to the fact that it is a reliable newspaper of record.) Also used 
is the Washington Post. While The New York Times articles from the 1940‟s found during the 
research for this thesis seem to be in favor of stronger federal legislation, a few of the 
Washington Post articles are quite obviously opposed to federal legislation.
32
 However, when 
checked with other sources such as congressional hearings and speeches by members of Congress 
found elsewhere, the articles, as slant as they might be, do not seem to have left out any of the 
major issues and arguments used in the congressional debates. Articles in The Atlanta 
Constitution from the 1940‟s have also been used in attempt to provide alternative perspectives 
on the soldier voting debates from a Southern newspaper. However, the articles found in the latter 
                                                 
29
 See for instance David L. Norman,  Assistant Attorney General in the Department of Justice, letter to Eugene 
Marans dated March 13, 1972, in U.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Elections of the Committee on House 
Administration, Voting rights for U.S. citizens residing abroad, Hearing on H.R. 3211, 94
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess.,  
February 25, 26, March 11, 1975, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975): 78, available through the 
University of Michigan/HathiTrust‟s digitization project at  http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015082029532 
accessed November 4, 2010.  
30
 The laws are available through www.heinonline.com. Other official documents such as congressional hearings 
from past decades can be accessed though the University of Michigan/HathiTrust‟s digitization project. 
31
 Gallup December 5, 1943. 
32
 See chapter two. 
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newspaper raise the same issues, and even seem to be more liberal and more in favor of strong 
federal legislation than The New York Times articles found.
33
 Newspapers have been less useful 
for the chapter that discusses overseas voting rights for civilians in the 1970‟s, as relevant articles 
have been scarce. However, that very fact is relevant to the topic of the thesis, as the general lack 
of interest in the voting rights of overseas private citizens seems to have been one of the factors 
influencing policy debates. After the 2000 presidential election debacle, media interest seemed to 
have been raised again, at least for a while.  
 The Congressional Digest serves as a very useful source. Two 1944 issues were devoted 
to the absentee soldier voting issue. The issues provide speeches and letters by members of 
Congress in favor of federal legislation and by members opposed to federal legislation. The 
Congressional Digest’s stated aim is to give a presentation of the pro‟s and con‟s of the most 
pressing legislative issues in Congress. While it might be hazardous to rely on the Digest‟s 
selection of “speakers”, the Digest does in fact seem to give the main opponents and proponents a 
voice, judging by newspaper articles and congressional hearings.     
Another useful primary source is The Unknown Ambassadors: a Saga of Citizenship by 
Phyllis Michaux.
34
 The book offers a personal account of the efforts of overseas Americans‟ 
interest groups which aim at influencing U.S. policy concerning issues that affect overseas 
citizens, including overseas voting rights. The book covers the period from when she first arrived 
in France in the 1940‟s to the year the book was published in 1996. Michaux was a member of, 
and even the leader of a number of such interest groups. While a personal account of this kind 
might be a subjective source of information, and Michaux might, for instance, have exaggerated 
her and her organizations‟ efforts, the efforts of overseas Americans in attaining voting rights 
have been recognized by a number of other sources. The International IDEA Handbook of Voting 
from Abroad (2007) by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance maintains that the 
U.S. represents “one of those rare cases” where overseas citizens efforts have been the main 
factor behind gaining such rights.
35
 Furthermore, judging by the hearings in the 1970‟s (with 
accompanying documents that includes letters,) it seems that the sponsors of the bills were in 
                                                 
33
 See for instance Gladstone Williams, “FDR Action on Soldier Vote Bill Significant,” The Atlanta Constitution, 
March 9, 1944, available through www.ajc.com accessed July 25, 2011. 
34
 Phyllis Michaux, The unknown Ambassadors: A Saga of Citizenship (Canada: Aletheia Publications, 1996). 
35
 Dark III 2003; Andrew Ellis, “The history and politics of external voting” in Voting from Abroad: The 
International IDEA Handbook (Stockholm and Mexico City: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance, and The Federal electoral Institute of Mexico, 2007) 43. 
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close contact with the interest groups and asked for their help in preparing legal analysis etc.
36
 
Michaux‟ account of events has been particularly useful for chapter two which deals with policy 
discussions during the 1960‟s and 1970‟s. 
 This thesis writer was also fortunate to get a personal telephone interview with Eugene 
Marans.
37
 Marans was the lawyer who led the lobbying efforts in Washington D.C. He worked 
pro bono for the overseas Americans‟ interest groups, preparing legal argumentation in favor of 
overseas voting rights, testifying in hearings, communicating directly with members of Congress 
etc.  
1.3 Voting Rights and the Constitution: Federal versus State Powers 
Curiously, while the U.S. sees itself as the champion of democratic ideals, universal suffrage is 
not guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, unlike many other constitutions in western democracies. 
As the Supreme Court ruling in Bush v. Gore in 2000 affirmed, there is “no federal constitutional 
right to vote.”38 Though the American colonies had fought a revolution in the spirit of “no 
taxation without representation,” representation did not imply universal suffrage at the time of the 
Constitutional Convention (1787). At the time, the very word democracy gave rise to images of 
chaos and mob rule.
39
 But the Founding Fathers pragmatically refrained from listing restrictive 
voter qualifications, partly to avoid disagreement among the thirteen former colonies that already 
had their own suffrage rules, and partly to reduce potential opposition to the Constitution.
40
 
Instead, the states were left to decide who could vote. At the time, that typically meant that white, 
property owning men gained the suffrage.  
 
Qualification versus Regulation 
The constitutional provisions that the states have relied on to control the franchise are the 
following. Article One Section Two of the Constitution reads: “The House of Representatives 
                                                 
36
 House hearing, Voting rights for U.S. citizens residing abroad, 1975; U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on 
Privileges and Elections of the Committee on Rules and Administration, Voting by U.S. citizens residing abroad, 
Hearing on S. 2102 & S. 2384, 93
rd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., September 26, 27, 1973, (Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1973), available through the University of Michigan/HathiTrust‟s digitization project at 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015078681031 accessed November 4, 2010. 
37
 Personal telephone interview with Eugene Marans, May 3, 2011. 
38
 Majority decision in Bush v. Gore quoted in Keyssar 2009: 262.  
39
 Keyssar 2009: 2. 
40
 Keyssar 2009: 329. 
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shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and 
the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for the electors of the most 
numerous branch of the State Legislature.” Article One Section Three reads “The Senate of the 
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each state, chosen by the legislatures 
thereof,” but the latter phrase was in 1913 superseded by Section One of the Seventeenth 
Amendment reading “elected by the people thereof,” and the “electors in each State shall have 
the qualifications requisite for the electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.” 
Finally, Article Two Section One deals with presidential elections, and stipulates that “each state 
shall appoint, in such a manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors” who 
were then to choose the president.
41
 In other words, the several states are given the task to 
organize and conduct federal elections and set voter qualifications.    
 However, the Constitution proscribes a regulatory role for Congress. The primary 
provision granting Congress this role is Article One Section Four which reads: “The times, places 
and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each 
State by the Legislatures thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such 
regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.” By the time the federal debates over 
absentee voting for soldiers began, the power of Congress to regulate elections had already been 
recognized by the Court. Several cases since Ex Parte Siebold (1879) had done so, including the 
1941 ruling in United States v. Classic when the Supreme Court held that Congress also had the 
authority to regulate primary elections.
42
 As concerns presidential elections, the text of the 
Constitution is more limited. Article Two Section One reads: “Congress may determine the Time 
of chusing [sic] the Electors, and the day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall 
be the same throughout the United States.”  However, the Supreme Court and federal courts have 
later upheld certain federal laws that have gone beyond the mere time and day of choosing 
electors.
43
 As concerns state and local elections however, the Constitution does not give any 
general regulative authority to Congress, though several constitutional amendments give 
Congress authority to enforce prohibitions against certain specific discriminatory practices in all 
elections. The states‟ constitutional power to set voter qualifications and Congress‟ power to 
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regulate federal elections has invited conflict as the two powers are not clearly defined. Does for 
instance absentee voting legislation involve regulating elections, altering voter qualifications, or 
both?  
 
 Amending and reinterpreting the Constitution 
One way the states limited voting eligibility was by requiring that voters be U.S. citizens. In 
colonial and post-revolutionary America, voting and the concept of citizenship were not linked. 
Property ownership was the dominating qualification. As the states began eliminating this 
economic barrier, state after state began explicitly demanding other qualifications, including 
citizenship. In the 1840‟s and 1950‟s nativists tried to lengthen the naturalization process to 
hinder (new) immigrants from becoming voters, so that they could stay in power. After the Civil 
War and the passing of the Thirteenth Amendment of 1865 that abolished slavery, Southern states 
in particular attempted to keep the freed slaves from gaining the same rights and privileges as 
white people, including gaining political membership. A way of doing this was to exclude 
African Americans from citizenship. In 1857, in fact, even the Supreme Court had announced in 
Dred Scott that no black person could become a citizen of the U.S. The Fourteenth Amendment 
(1868) sought to reverse Dred Scott and enshrined the concepts of national citizenship and equal 
protection of the law into the Constitution. Any person born or naturalized in the U.S. were 
citizens both of the state wherein they resided, and of the U.S.
44
 The Fifteenth Amendment, 
passed two years later, specifically prohibited discrimination in voting based on race, color, or 
previous conditions of servitude. The post Civil War amendments offered a breakthrough in legal 
thinking, not only as they incorporated blacks into society, but previously, most Americans had 
looked to the states, not the federal government, to protect the rights of citizens. An all-powerful 
federal government had previously been seen as the one to be feared, not state and local 
authorities. The Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments to the Constitution passed in 1791) 
reflected this assumption, as it protects individuals from abuse by Congress, not the states. As the 
post Civil War amendments were passed, the federal government would protect the “privileges 
and immunities” of its citizens against the states, though the constitutional amendments did not 
specify what these terms implied. In fact, discussions concerning how the Constitution should be 
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interpreted started almost from the time it was ratified. Different schools of thought have argued 
whether the Constitution should be interpreted narrowly and merely through its “original intent” 
or whether it should be interpreted more broadly through the idea of a living Constitution.
45
  
The women‟s suffrage movement was disappointed that the Fifteenth Amendment had not 
included a prohibition of discriminating on the basis of sex. However, they became inspired by 
the idea of national citizenship rights. They began arguing that there was no need for further 
constitutional amendments, as voting rights were implied in the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment which guaranteed federal protection of “privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States”. At that time, the Supreme Court did not agree however. In a 1875 ruling it 
announced that voting rights were not an inherent right of citizenship. The women‟s suffrage 
movement redirected their efforts once again, finally achieving their goal in 1920 by the passing 
of the Nineteenth Amendment which prohibits voting discrimination on account of sex. And so, 
yet another constitutional limit on state power to set qualifications was achieved.
46
   
   The late 1950‟s through the early 1970‟s saw a legal revolution that removed most 
remaining limits to the right to vote. Federal acts, constitutional amendments (abolishing the poll 
tax and lowering the voting age to 18), and Supreme Court reinterpretation of the Constitution 
enabled this. The Warren Court, both reflecting and reinforcing the popular mood, broke grounds 
when it began seeing democracy as a core constitutional value. The Warren Court began using 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in particular, as a means of justifying 
breaking down various state barriers to voting. Keyssar writes that these years‟ legal revolution 
constituted a nationalization of the right to vote, which in practice brought an end to state control 
over the franchise (despite the words written in the Constitution concerning states and voter 
qualifications.)
47
  
Nonetheless, voting rights are still not automatic to citizenship. For instance, while U.S. 
citizens formally residing in Washington D.C. gained the right to vote in presidential elections by 
the Twenty-third Amendment (1961), constitutional provisions still prevent them from voting in 
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congressional elections. Puerto Ricans, although U.S. citizens can not vote in federal elections 
either, and states may still (and do still) withhold voting rights from felons and even ex-felons. 
Voting rights of citizens residing abroad who may have no intention of ever returning, are 
perhaps therefore not completely self evident. In the 1940‟s, proponents of federal absentee 
legislation for soldiers did not manage to convince opponents that such legislation involved the 
regulation of elections. In the end, proponents relied on the argument that in time of war, 
Congress could pass legislation that it could not normally have passed. Having removed soldiers 
from their voting districts to have them fight in the World War, Congress also had the power and 
duty to ensure that those men and women were not disenfranchised merely because of this 
required absence.
48
 Today, however, federal legislation concerning absentee voting rights for 
citizens covered by UOCAVA is commonly categorized under congressional regulatory powers 
over elections.
49
 
1.4 Structure 
The thesis has a chronological structure. It is divided into five chapters: an introductory chapter 
(chapter one), three main content chapters, and a concluding chapter. Chapter two discusses 
policy debates in the 1940‟s and 1950‟s. These debates centered on the absentee voting rights of 
members of the Armed Forces, though by 1955, Congress had begun to extend its commitment to 
certain other civilian groups. Chapter three discusses policy debates in the 1960‟s and 1970‟s. 
During these decades, debates centered on whether or not to include all civilians residing abroad 
in the act that covered service people. The chapter includes a discussion of overseas interest 
groups‟ influence in gaining overseas voting rights. Chapter three discusses recent policy debates. 
UOCAVA was passed in the 1980‟s, but its main purpose was to consolidate existing acts.50 
Chapter three therefore focuses on debates after the 2000 presidential election scandal, as well as 
on UOCAVA‟s significance to that election. Chapter five, the conclusion, finally attempts to 
bring together the major factors that have influenced debates since the 1940‟s. 
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-2- 
The 1940’s and 1950’s: Absentee Voting Rights of 
Members of the Military 
This chapter focuses on federal policy discussions concerning absentee voting rights of 
servicemen in the 1940‟s and 1950‟s. When discussing voting rights of servicemen, it comes 
perhaps as no surprise that war was an important factor influencing such debates. In the 
timeframe covered by this chapter, these included the two World Wars, as well as the Korean 
War. War created a real need for absentee voting procedures, as significant numbers of men and 
women were sent away from their voting districts (and out of the country) in the line of duty. 
Furthermore, war made these citizens especially worthy of (voting) rights as they were risking 
their lives at the battlefront for the good of the nation, and it became increasingly difficult to 
justify their disenfranchisement.  
However, opposition to federal involvement in the issue of soldiers‟ absentee voting 
rights remained significant even through the 1950‟s, and it hampered initiatives to pass strong 
federal legislation. The cause of this opposition was the fact that federal involvement raised 
deeper issues than the mere practical aspects of establishing absentee procedures for this limited 
group of citizens. The debates over military voting began two decades before the groundbreaking 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965 were passed.
51
 Congressmen 
representing the white South feared that federal absentee voting legislation for service people 
would set a precedent for federal “intrusion” in the Jim Crow based arrangements of Southern 
society, especially in the field of voting rights. Conversely, some supporters of such federal 
legislation cheered it on exactly because they hoped it would set such a precedent.
 52
  The debates 
also came at a time when opposition the New Deal was mounting, and federal efforts at 
controlling absentee voting procedures for the military seemed to such opponents as yet another 
                                                 
51
 The term “military voting” as well as “soldier voting” implies absentee voting and voting rights of uniformed 
service members. These are the terms used by Alvarez et al. and by the acts, and by participants in the discussions in 
the 1940‟a and 1950‟s. 
52
 In addition to its limited potential role in enfranchising those African Americans who served in the armed forces. 
See for instance Lawson Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944-1969 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1976) 75.   
17 
 
move to increase federal powers.
 53
 In other words, the soldiers‟ absentee voting debates involved 
broader issues of states‟ rights in general. Partisan politics and presidential involvement (once 
polls showed that Roosevelt would clearly gain from the military vote,) became other important 
factors in the policy debates.
54
 Unclear constitutional language concerning federal and state 
powers over elections became the focus of discussions. 
This chapter discusses how these factors influenced federal policy debates concerning 
absentee military voting, how they affected the legislation that resulted from these debates, and 
how effective the federal policy was at enfranchising service people. The legislation passed in the 
1940‟s and 1950‟s might have had a limited effect on actually enabling those in the military to 
vote,
55
 however, the Soldier Voting Act of 1942 was a starting point for federal involvement in 
the field of absentee voting rights for service people - the act was the first federal legislation to 
guarantee voting rights for members of the armed forces.
56
 Furthermore, when Congress passed 
the Federal Voting Assistance Act in 1955, it extended its commitment to absentee voting rights 
to include certain overseas civilians.
57
 The Federal Voting Assistance Program that resulted from 
this act, is still is in force for carrying out federal responsibilities for uniformed and overseas 
voters today. 
2.1 Early Beginnings 
While absentee voting legislation for soldiers was not seriously considered in Congress until the 
1940‟s, the question of giving soldiers the privilege of voting from the battlefield was considered 
by all the states during the Civil War. At least eleven of the twenty-five Union states passed such 
legislation.
58
 Arguments of giving special voting privileges to soldiers as a reward for their 
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sacrifices and contributions to the war effort, had been raised already in connection with the 
American Revolution. Such principled reasoning for enfranchising soldiers would be present 
throughout American history.
59
 However, partisan political consideration was equally important 
for motivating initiatives to enact soldier voting legislation during the Civil War. It was 
commonly believed that soldiers of the Union states would vote for the Republican Party which 
was the “pro-war party,” and for Abraham Lincoln in particular, their commander-in-chief. 
Opposition to absentee soldier voting laws therefore came mainly from the Copperhead 
Democrats.
60
 Lincoln himself took great interest in the issue, and was so concerned about the 
outcome of the election that he asked General Sherman to give soldiers from states that did not 
provide for absentee procedures permission to return home to vote. Lincoln received 78 percent 
of the soldier vote, but its importance to the outcome of the presidential election is unclear. 
However, the soldier vote was possibly critical in certain congressional races.
61
  
   At the turn of the century, the states had also begun legislating on absentee voting for 
civilians. In 1896, Vermont was the first state to extend absentee voting to civilians.
62
 Civilian 
absentee voting laws were partly a reflection of increased mobility caused by the expansion of the 
railroad system and partly caused by an extension of the idea of servicemen absentee voting.
63
 
Kansas was in 1901 the next state to introduce civilian absentee voting, but made it apply solely 
to rail road workers.
64
 For links were being made between the special voting rights of servicemen 
and those of traveling salesmen and trainmen and others working for the industrial growth of the 
nation and thus also in the public good though not as impressive as the sacrifices made by 
soldiers and sailors.
65
 By 1924, only four states did not provide for absentee voting.
66
 In 1924, a 
few states restricted absentee voting to servicemen, a few states restricted it to civilians, while 
others covered both servicemen and civilians, explicitly or implicitly. Laws concerning civilian 
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voters were often restricted to specific groups (such as the handicapped or the elderly) or had 
geographical limitations. Overseas civilians were excluded from absentee voting laws till at least 
1938 in all states but Tennessee and Virginia which specifically included their citizens abroad.
67
 
 The issue of absentee voting rights for service people was again raised in connection with 
the First World War, and nearly all states allowed soldiers to vote absentee during the war.
68
 
However, neither Congress nor the Wilson Administration took a great interest in the situation. 
No presidential election was held during the war, something that might account for the 
president‟s lack of interest. Two relevant bills were introduced in Congress that were not acted 
upon, and while the state of New York, for instance, attempted to send a delegation overseas to 
poll the soldiers, the War Department stopped them. No state was to poll its soldiers in the field, 
as the department feared it would interfere with the war effort.
69
 
2.2 Debates During the Second World War 
The Second World War brought the issue of absentee soldier voting to the federal level of 
government. Popular opinion favored some sort of action to ensure the voting rights of the men 
and women who were making great sacrifices for the good of the nation. Many argued that 
servicemen fighting for democracy overseas should have the right to participate in democracy 
back home. By 1942, most states had absentee voting laws covering servicemen, but the 
adequacy of such laws varied a great deal from state to state. Servicemen faced a myriad of 
complex and time consuming absentee voting regulations. During the Second World War, each 
troop could be made up of servicemen from all of the 48 states, each with different procedures 
and deadlines. This made matters more complicated than during the Civil War soldiers had been 
organized into state units. Simply informing each serviceman in each unit of the specific 
requirements of the various states, became more difficult. During the Civil War, several states 
had even set up polling stations in the field to poll its soldiers. In 1942, states required individual 
correspondence between the voter and his or her state via mail. Even if the voter managed to stay 
informed and followed all instructions, a major obstacle to having one‟s ballot counted was the 
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fact that many states did not forward ballots early enough for them to be executed and returned in 
time. Several members of Congress believed that the federal government needed to get involved. 
A uniform and effective method of voting was needed to guarantee the enfranchisement of 
members of the Armed Forces. In the view of these Congressmen, this could not be achieved if 
the matter was left up to the 48 states.
70
  
 Debates in Congress began only a few months before the 1942 elections, and resulted 
in the Soldier Voting Act of 1942. The soldier voting issue was brought up again the next year in 
anticipation of the 1944 elections, and several amendments to the 1942 act were made. The 
Soldier Voting Act was the first federal legislation guaranteeing voting rights in congressional 
and presidential elections of members of the armed forces in time of war. It waved in-person 
registration and poll tax requirements, and contained provisions aimed at streamlining voting 
procedures.
71
 
 
States’ Rights, Civil Rights and the Constitution 
Absentee soldier voting became one of the most controversial and most fiercely debated topics in 
1942 to 1944, and was elaborately covered by the media. A New York Times article dated 
September 6, 1942, for instance, described the soldier voting issue as “the most volatile measure 
dropped into the hoppers since Pearl Harbor. For the debate on the Soldier‟s Vote Bill developed 
into a dog fight with far-flung ramifications.”72 The reason was that these debates involved more 
than the practical issues of absentee procedures. Discussions concerning soldier voting were 
initiated at a time when opposition to Roosevelt‟s New Deal was mounting, and opponents saw 
the drive for federal involvement in soldier voting as yet another attempt by New Dealers to 
centralize power at the federal level. In addition, many Southern Democrats specifically feared 
that soldier voting legislation would set a precedent for federal involvement in election processes. 
In other words, they feared that a federal soldier voting act would signal the first step towards 
enfranchising African-Americans who were being kept from the polls in the Jim Crow based 
Southern states (in addition to potentially enfranchising African-Americans serving in the Armed 
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Forces.)
73
 Policy debates therefore turned into theoretical discussions on the constitutional 
powers of Congress (and the limits thereof). While Congressmen typically proclaimed to be in 
favor of voting rights for servicemen - a popular group among voters in general - opponents of 
federal soldier voting legislation claimed it went beyond the constitutional powers of Congress.
74
 
 Proponents of federal involvement presented the issue as one concerning the regulation of 
elections and pointed therefore to the Election Clause to argue that Congress would be acting in 
line with the Constitution.
75
 Article One, Section Four, Clause One of the Constitution, reads as 
follows: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and representatives, 
shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by 
Law make or alter such Regulations, excepts as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.” 
Congressional powers to regulate elections had by then already been confirmed by the Supreme 
Court,
76
 and proponents therefore argued that federal laws regulating absentee voting for 
servicemen would supersede state laws. 
 Opponents of federal involvement, on the other hand, argued that the issue concerned 
voter qualifications, and pointed to another constitutional provision.
77
 Article One, Section Two, 
Clause One and the Seventeenth Amendment both stipulate that “the electors in each state shall 
have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.” 
This passage has been, and still is, interpreted as meaning that only the states can set eligibility 
requirements for voting, though states are limited by constitutional amendments prohibiting 
discrimination based on race, color, or previous conditions of servitude (Fifteenth Amendment, 
1870), sex (Nineteenth Amendment, 1920), and the constitutional assurance that no state shall 
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (Fourteenth 
Amendment, 1868).
78
 Proponents rejected the argument that soldier voting legislation dealt with 
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the qualifications of voters, and pointed to the text of bill (that became law) that read “every 
individual absent from the place of his residence and serving in the land or naval forces” “who is 
or was eligible to vote at any election under the law of the State of his residence [emphasis 
added] shall be entitled to […]”79Among other things, the bill that became law in 1942 waived 
registration requirements. Defending his bill, Representative R. L. Ramsay (D-WV) tried to 
convince Congress that registration did not have the same meaning as qualification. He argued 
that whether someone had registered or not did not make that person better equipped or a more 
qualified voter.
80
 
The provision of the Soldier Voting Act (and prior bill) causing particular controversy 
was the one waiving poll tax requirements. At the time the soldier voting issue was raised, 
Congress had already begun discussing whether or not it should pass anti-poll tax legislation for 
the general population. Many of the arguments concerning qualification versus regulation were 
therefore repeated in the two parallel discussions. Some of those in favor of the general anti-poll 
tax legislation hoped to enfranchise the poor, white or black, while other supporters saw it 
specifically as one step forward in the battle to enfranchise African Americans. Despite the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Southern black population was kept from the polls by a variety of 
means, including poll taxes, literacy tests conducted by subjective voting officers, and downright 
intimidation. Many Southern Democrats and civil rights supporters alike saw the poll tax waver 
in the soldier voting bills as a first step of passing anti-poll tax bills for the general population.
81
  
The Second World War gave fuel to the civil rights movement. Discrepancies in ideals of 
equality, liberty and democracy at home became harder to tolerate. Civil rights activist argued 
that if African-Americans were good enough to die for the country, they were good enough to 
participate in its politics. The civil rights movement believed that achieving voting rights for 
African-Americans would be a good place to begin unraveling the Jim Crow system, filling 
public offices with sympathetic liberals. In 1942, an article in The New York Times reported that 
the National Negro Council was attempting to elect an African-American from Mississippi to 
Congress, with the help of African-American soldiers under the new Soldier Voting Act.
82
 One of 
the principal opponents of federal soldier voting legislation was a Southern Democrat 
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representing Mississippi in the House of Representatives called John E. Rankin. Criticizing 
federal involvement in the soldier voting issue on constitutional grounds, he said, in a twist to the 
civil rights movement‟s line of argument, “We are not fighting to destroy the Constitution; we are 
not fighting to destroy our State governments, but we are fighting to preserve them.”83 Herbert 
Wechsler, at the time an attorney in the Justice Department helping formulate the Green-Lucas 
soldier voting bill in 1943-44, described Rankin as “one of the most miserable characters I think I 
have ever encountered in this life […] John Rankin was certainly one of the most racist, 
prejudiced people to come to the Congress, even in those days, from anywhere in the country.”84  
 
1942: The Soldier Voting Act is Passed and Put to the Test  
Despite controversy and fierce debates, the Soldier Voting Act of 1942 passed by a clear 
majority, though many congressmen were away from Washington for the summer at the time that 
happened. On July 23, 1942, the original bill that had been introduced by Congressman Ramsay 
passed in the House by a 139 to 19 vote, with less than a third of the House voting. The Senate 
amended the bill by adding an anti poll tax provision, and passed the amended bill by a 47 to 5 
vote on August 25, with 44 senators not voting. The House later approved by a 248 to 53 vote, 
125 not voting, and the bill was signed by the president on September 16, 1942.
85
 The act opened 
with the following statement: 
In time of War, notwithstanding any provision of State law relating to the registration of qualified 
voters, every individual absent from the place of his residence and serving in the land and naval 
forces of the United States, including the members of the Army Nurse Corps, the Navy Nurse 
Corps, the Women‟s Navy Reserve, and the Women‟s Army Auxiliary Corps, who is or was 
eligible to register for or is qualified to vote at any election under the law of the State of his 
residence, shall be entitled, as provided in this Act, to vote for electors of President, and Vice 
President of the United States, United States Senators, and Representatives in Congress.
86
  
The act required that persons covered by it be exempted from registration and poll tax 
requirements. Furthermore, it required that the Secretaries of War and Navy print and distribute 
post cards to be used as ballot applications, and these post cards applications could be sent free of 
postage in the U.S. mail. Upon receipt of such application cards, the secretary of state of each 
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state were to forward an official war ballot to the applicant, as soon as possible. The states were 
to print their own ballots, but the act outlined what such ballots should look like. While the 
Soldier Voting Act guaranteed the right to vote in federal elections, states were left with the sole 
power over state and local elections as even several proponents of strong federal soldier voting 
legislation believed the Congress‟ constitutional powers were limited to federal elections. The 
states could therefore chose if they wanted to add the names of candidates for state, county and 
other local offices, to the official war ballot. The act also guaranteed that the federal government 
would reimburse to the states the costs incurred by carrying out its mandatory provisions. 
Furthermore, the act also stipulated that if members of the land and naval forces wished to 
disregard the voting procedures proscribed by the federal act, they were free to vote through 
parallel state mandated procedures (that had been in place prior to the passing of the act.)
87
  
Though the act had passed through Congress, no agreement had been reached concerning 
whether federal absentee voting legislation involved setting voter qualifications (which was a 
state prerogative) or regulating elections (which was a federal prerogative that superseded state 
regulations.) In the end, proponents had argued that since the bill only was relevant “in time of 
war”, one did not need to settle that question. In Wechsler‟s personal account of the debates, he 
explains that Congress had passed other bills during wartime that it would not have been able to 
pass during peacetime, for instance the act that put a moratorium on the foreclosure of mortgages 
of servicemen. Proponents therefore argued that this “war power” also included protecting the 
voting rights of servicemen who had been deprived of that right because they had been dislocated 
as a result of “the legitimate exercise of national powers in the fighting of the war.”88 It seems 
that this reasoning somewhat appeased states‟ rights oriented members of Congress. Servicemen 
would not be guaranteed the same rights under the Soldier Voting Act during peacetime. 
Furthermore, Southern senators had not dared filibuster the bill because it would be difficult to 
justify to their constituents why they seemed to be depriving servicemen of the vote. Also easing 
the passage of the bill was the fact that by the time the act would be signed, the Southern states 
had already held their white primaries. With the strong Democratic hold on the South, these race-
based primaries were in fact the only meaningful elections in those states.
89
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Just like during the First World War, the War Department resisted the polling of overseas 
servicemen. Again, the department approved of the principle of granting the vote to every soldier 
and sailor, but was concerned that it would interfere with the war effort by overburdening 
shipping space and be a window of opportunity for the enemy to gather vital secret information 
concerning the location and number of troops.
90
 Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson had 
expressed his concerns while the bill was still pending in Congress, and had asked that it be made 
to apply only to the forces still in the U.S. and Alaska. This request was not met, and by 
September 24, the War Department had begun shipping post card applications overseas in 
compliance with the act.
91
 However, just as during the last war, the department stopped New 
York state from sending state ballots overseas, twice, on account of scarce shipping space.
92
 In 
the end, no servicemen overseas were polled. And in fact, the Soldier Voting Act did not seem to 
have had any effect on increasing the number of servicemen who were able to vote.
93
 Of 
5,000,000 servicemen (though not all of voting age), fewer than 140,000 applied for federal war 
ballots, and only 28,051 had their ballots counted. No statistics are available concerning the 
number of voted cast through state laws.
94
 
A contemporary analysis by the Bureau of Census named four reasons for the poor results 
of the Soldier Voting Act.
95
 First of all, it had been enacted too close to the election (less than 
two months before the November election,) to be successfully implemented, the Census Bureau 
explained. Secondly, soldiers could vote under either state or federal law (which probably was a 
source of confusion, but also might mean that soldiers might have voted under state laws, votes 
that were not recorded.) Thirdly, the 1942 election were mid-term elections which often attracted 
fewer voters. And finally, the Census Bureau questioned whether states forwarded ballots early 
enough. Nonetheless, the act was a move forward. According to Pamela S. Karlan, it was the first 
federal legislation passed to expand black voting rights since the end of Reconstruction.
96
 
According to R. Michael Alvarez et al. , it was one of the first (if not the first) case in which the 
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federal government had subsidized state and local election administration.
97
 And, according to 
Coleman, it was the first federal legislation to guarantee voting rights of members of the armed 
forces.
98
 
 
1943-1944: Improvements Still Needed 
The issue of soldier voting was again raised in 1943. Hearings were held in both Houses of 
Congress. In late November 1943, bill S.1285 was introduced in the Senate to amend the Soldier 
Voting Act of 1942, sponsored by Senators Theodore F. Green (D-Ill) and Scott W. Lucas (D-
RI). An identical bill was soon thereafter introduced in the House by Representative Eugene 
Worley (D-TX).
99
 All but two states, South Carolina and New Mexico, had enacted absentee 
balloting legislation in 1943.
100
 However, the quality of state laws had not improved much, and 
the mere presence of such laws were of little use if they were of no practical use. The Soldier 
Voting Act of 1942 had offered an alternative method of voting, but had not erased state laws 
concerning soldier voting that were left as optional methods of voting for servicemen.
101
 
Defending his bill, Senator Green stated that: 
If State legislation on the subject were adequate, there would have been no need for Public Law 
712, nor would there be any need for S.1285 which merely seeks to make Public Law 712 more 
effective. State absentee-balloting procedures, however, are too complicated, time consuming, and 
far too variable to permit effective administration or to afford a genuine opportunity for members 
of the armed forces to vote.
102
 
Under state procedures, at least three to five steps were necessary to successfully cast a ballot.
103
 
First, the serviceman had to send a ballot application to his home state. Then the state would 
forward him a ballot, and finally the serviceman would have to execute and return the ballot. 
Some states also required that servicemen first apply for a ballot application, which would add 
two steps. According to one senator, eight states had poll taxes, and the poll tax would in some 
cases be between one and two dollars (a soldiers‟ monthly pay was fifty dollars,) and the poll tax 
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might also add steps to the voting process.
104
 Furthermore, by the 1944 election, many 
servicemen would have obtained their voting age since joining the Armed Forces. Voting would 
therefore be nearly impossible for those who came from states that required in-person registration 
(i.e. physical presence in the state.)
 105
 The Army found it challenging to keep servicemen 
informed of the many deadlines and procedures of the forty-two states. One of the biggest 
problems, however, was transit time. In twenty-seven states, a voter could not apply for a ballot 
earlier than thirty days before an election, while the Department of War estimated that a 
minimum of forty-five days was needed, at least for servicemen stationed overseas.
106
 
  While the Soldier Voting Act had offered a simplified and uniform method of voting, 
three steps were still needed to successfully cast a ballot: a post-card ballot application had to be 
sent to state officials, state officials had to forward the federal ballot to the applicant, and the 
applicant had to return the ballot. A November 15 report by the Senate Committee on Privileges 
and Elections claimed that the main reason for the inadequacy of the act was the inefficiency of 
having multiple procedural steps to successfully cast a ballot.
107
 The Green-Lucas and Worley 
bills proposed to eliminate two steps by removing the need to apply for ballots. The bills would 
have created a bipartisan U.S. War Ballot Commission that would produce blank federal ballots, 
and that would also take over the burden of administration imposed on the Armed Services by the 
1942 act. The commission would make lists containing the names of all candidates up for 
election based on information gathered from all the states. A balloting day was to be chosen in 
each military and naval unit after the lists had been received. Servicemen would fill in the federal 
write-in absentee ballots, and place them in special envelopes. Each envelope was placed in an 
outer envelope, together with the voter‟s personal data. All envelopes from the military or navy 
units were then to be transported to the commission, which would forward them to the various 
Secretaries of State. To prevent fraud, reports were to be made on the number of ballots handled 
by the Secretaries of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Federal Ballot Commission and the various 
Secretaries of States. Reports would then be compared. The proposed bills also contained a 
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penalty provision pertaining to fraud and obstruction of the voting procedure under the act. This 
absentee balloting machinery was to be made available not only to servicemen (stationed in the 
U.S. and overseas,) but also to members of the merchant marine and to civilian employees of the 
U.S. stationed overseas. The provisions of the 1942 act waiving registration and poll tax 
requirements were left unchanged.
108
 
 
New and Continued Controversies 
From the fall of 1943 until the November 1944 elections, the soldier voting issue caused 
“extremely bitter controversy in Congress,”109 just as it had in 1942, perhaps even more so this 
time. And again, it attracted the corresponding media interest. Congressional Digest, a periodical 
designed to provide a forum for discussing the pro‟s and cons‟ of the most important bills 
pending in Congress, devoted two issues to the topic in 1944. The January issue discussed 
nothing but the soldier voting bills, and the June-July issue more generally discussed federal 
versus states‟ rights in voting, including soldier voting, the poll tax, and the all-white primaries. 
According to the Congressional Digest, the first session of the 78
th
 Congress (1943) had been 
“the most turbulent session since the inauguration of the New Deal in 1933.”110  
 Partly, this turbulence was caused by the soldier vote issue itself, and partly, this 
turbulence was the back-drop to which the soldier issue had to be solved. Opposition to 
Roosevelt‟s New Deal programs was but increasing, and was especially strong in the Southern 
and border states. There was turbulence between the president and Congress, within Congress, 
and within the Democratic Party. The general poll tax issue had not been resolved. Democrats 
were split over the House approved anti-poll tax bill that was still pending in the Senate at the 
end of 1943. In June, Congress had repassed the Smith-Connelly anti-strike bill over the 
President‟s veto, and later passed a bill that would give the administration only about a third of 
the tax revenues it had asked for. Nor had the food subsidies controversy been resolved by the 
end of the session either.
111
 Furthermore, uncertainty about a possible fourth term for Roosevelt 
put Democrats in an uneasy situation. Democrats were waiting to decide if they should run on a 
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win-the-war, support the Commander-in-Chief platform in the case of his re-election, or if they 
should go back to “old Democratic principles, denounce bureaucracy and centralization of power, 
and try to line up the party votes.”112 The civil rights movement was also stirring things up. 
Pending in the Supreme Court was a case that would end in a ruling on April 3, 1944 that 
ultimately abolished the white primary. The 1942 Soldier Voting Act had not settled the states‟ 
rights issues it involved. While one senator had applauded the passage of the Soldier Vote Act for 
giving assurance that Congress would vote to wipe out the poll tax entirely as a requirement for 
voting in federal elections, the act had made opponents grow more determined than ever to 
prevent the compete abolition of the poll tax. An “unreconstructured Southerner” had written to 
his daughter after the passage of the Soldier Voting Act that “all white people in Alabama are 
buying pistols and other ammunition in preparation for the race war that is coming.”113  
 Raising the stakes of the soldier voting issue in 1944 was the fact that unlike in 1942, 
there was a presidential election. Furthermore, the number of troops was increasing and thus also 
the number of votes at stake in an election predicted to be very close. In 1942, Roosevelt‟s 
Secretary of War had been accused of hindering overseas soldiers from voting. In 1944 however, 
having announced his fourth term candidacy, Roosevelt personally entered the stage in support of 
a federal plan to ensure that both soldiers at home and abroad would have a real opportunity to 
vote. Roosevelt had initially supported a general repeal of the poll tax, but had become silent on 
the issue as he feared loosing much needed Southern support for his New Deal programs.
114
 
Supporting soldier voting legislation seemed perhaps less risky to him, though his involvement 
became quite controversial. 
For also raising the stakes this time around was the fact that polls showed that a majority 
of soldiers would vote Democratic in the 1944 presidential election, adding a new dimension to 
the controversies. The division on the soldier voting issue was clearly not merely along sectional 
lines, but also along political lines. In 1942, there had been no time for open speculation about 
what party would benefit from enfranchising the soldiers. In June 1943, however, surveys 
executed by the American Institute of Public Opinion indicated that the Democrats would benefit 
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from the soldier vote.
115
 In December, another Gallup Poll indicated that sixty-one percent of 
servicemen favored the Democrats.
116
 According to the poll, this meant that sixty-one percent of 
the 6,000,000 votes that could make a difference in the election would go Democratic (having 
subtracted 2,000,000 servicemen who would not have reached voting age by the 1944 election, 
and having subtracted another 2,000,000 voters from the Southern states because Democratic 
soldier votes would have little effect in Southern states that were already overwhelmingly 
Democratic). The political aspect made the soldier voting issue especially controversial since the 
election was expected to be very close, and according to an article in The New York Times, it was 
the first election since 1932 that the “outs” (the Republicans) had a real chance of becoming the 
“ins”.117 The December Gallup poll cited above estimated that the civilian vote (40,000,000) 
would go fifty-two percent in favor of the Democrats. Adding the service vote would increase the 
margin, and give the Democrats an edge of fifty-three percent. With the service vote potentially 
determining the outcome of the presidential election, the debate became partisan, just as it had 
been in the Union states during the Civil War, when the Republicans would benefit from the 
soldier vote. These partisan motives would both encourage and obstruct the passing of stronger 
soldier voting legislation. 
 As a result, the camp favoring strong federal legislation was dominated by Northern 
Democrats, while the camp favoring weak or no federal legislation was dominated by 
Republicans and Southern states‟ rights Democrats, though there were certainly exceptions to the 
rule. Both camps claimed the other was acting in self interest, not in the interest of the soldiers. 
One Democratic senator accused the Southerners of his own party of forming “an unholy 
alliance” with the Republicans to deliberately withhold voting rights from servicemen, “the most 
unpatriotic unholy alliance that has occurred in the United States Senate since the League of 
Nations for peace of the world was defeated in 1919.”118 From the other camp, several Southern 
Democrats and Republicans were accusing Northern Democrats of speaking in a language of 
“make believe patriotism” when their motives rather were partisan, of once more of attempting to 
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“substitute New Deal hysteria for sound public thinking, and of concentrating power in the hands 
of the federal government.”119 Other Republicans accused Northern Democrats of deliberately 
drawing up an unconstitutional bill that would make the election end up in the House of 
Representatives where the Democratic majority would choose a Democratic president,
120
 or even 
worse, the election might end up in the Supreme Court which Roosevelt had stacked with New 
Deal friendly justices.
121
 Still others were judgingly asking why President Roosevelt had 
suddenly become so interested in the soldier voting issue.
122
 In private talks, some Southern 
Democrats were even wondered if a Republican president would be better than a fourth term with 
Roosevelt as it could give them four years to purge the New Dealers from the party, according to 
an article in Time Magazine.
123
 
 At a time when committee leaders were quite influential,
124
 it is interesting to note that 
the chairmen of the relevant committees in both houses of Congress were in fact two of the main 
sponsors of the strong federal bills: Senator Green (D-RI) who was chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Privileges and Elections, and Representative Worley (D-TX) who was Chairman 
of the House Committee on Elections. Curiously, Worley was a states‟ rights Texan, but he 
insisted that his bills did not involve the issue of states‟ rights.125 Two other central figures in 
favor of the federal plan were co-sponsor of the senate bill, Senator Lucas (D-IL), and House 
majority leader McCormack (D-MA). Democratic National Chairman Frank Walker was also a 
supporter, and testified in favor of a federal plan at a House hearing in October 1943, though 
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appearing in a personal capacity.
126
 The other camp, supporting a state control plan (i.e. 
supporting a weak or no federal act,) included Representative Rankin (D-MS) and Senator Robert 
A. Taft (R-OH), the first a fiercely “racist” states‟ rights Southerner, and the latter “a republican 
hopeful in the 1944 election.”127 Others included Senator Eastland (D-MS), also a states‟ rights 
adherent, and House Republican leader Martin Jr. (R-MA). Testifying in the same hearing as his 
counterpart, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Hon. Spangler, refused to give any 
opinion on the merits of the bill, despite Rankin‟s repetitive efforts at making him denounce it. “I 
want it understood I am in favor of any practical matter you can work out so that the soldiers can 
vote. As too the details, I pass no opinion; as to its constitutionality I pass no opinion.”128 Neither 
supporting nor denouncing the specific bill, he was probably trying to avoid making the 
Republican Party vulnerable to accusations of being against soldiers‟ voting rights.  
 
1943-1944: The Line of Events 
The Green-Lucas bill was defeated in the senate on December 3, as the senate instead adopted the 
Eastland-McKellar-McClellan substitute bill by a forty-two to thirty-seven vote.
129
 While the 
Green-Lucas bill would have strengthened the Soldier Voting Act of 1942 and broadened the 
federal role, the Eastland-McKellar-McClellan substitute bill would have made the act weaker 
would have reduced federal involvement. The substitute bill would merely have stated that 
Congress was in favor of giving service men the opportunity to vote, and would merely have 
recommended that the states take action to achieve that goal. It would have eliminated the poll tax 
and registration waivers from the Soldier Voting Act of 1942. Supporters of the federal plan 
called the substitute bill meaningless and claimed it would deprive soldiers of the vote.
130
 Senator 
Guffey (D-PA) claimed that the supporters of the substitute bill were also out to kill the anti-poll 
tax bill. Rankin called the passage of the Eastland-McKellar-McClellan bill “one of the greatest 
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victories for States‟ rights and constitutional government in the history of this nation.”131 In the 
House of Representatives, two bills were pending: one introduced by Rankin (House Joint 
Resolution 190) corresponding to the Eastland bill, and one introduced by Worley (H.R. 3436) 
corresponding to the Green-Lucas bill.
132
 Since the senate had rejected the Green-Lucas bill, the 
House Committee on Elections started considering the Rankin resolution.  
 On December 18, Worley introduced a compromise bill, (after conferences with House 
majority leader McCormack and House majority whip Ramspeck. The compromise bill would 
have kept the first two sections of the 1942 act concerning the poll tax and registration waiver 
and the guarantee that service men “shall have the right to vote”, but it would have made the 
other new provisions of the Green-Lucas bill voluntary for the states, for instance whether or not 
they accept the official Federal Write-in Ballots.
133
 According to Albright of the Washington 
Post, only extreme opponents immediately opposed the compromise bill, Rankin being one of 
them.
134
 Several members of the House Election Committee previously against the original 
Worley bill were reported to be wavering. Early January, 1944, in the senate, despite renewed 
efforts of compromise, states‟ rights proponents moved in the opposite direction as they 
announced they would form a caucus to solidify opposition to any kind of federal involvement in 
the election machinery.
135
 Green and Lucas introduced a compromise bill similar to the Worley 
bill, but senator Eastland, like Rankin in the House of Representatives, showed scant interest in 
any compromise.  
On January 26, President Roosevelt stepped directly into the Congressional 
controversy.
136
 A new states‟ rights substitute sponsored by Senator Taft was about to be 
introduced in the Senate when the president‟s message was read. In the letter to Congress, 
Roosevelt called the states‟ rights measure already passed by the Senate and awaiting action in 
the House a “fraud on the soldiers and sailors and marines” and “a fraud on the American 
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people.”137 He endorsed the Green-Lucas and Worley compromise bills, and claimed there was 
nothing in the proposed statute that violated states‟ rights. He stated that it certainly did not 
violate states‟ rights any more than the 1942 act did, or any more than the Soldiers‟ and Sailors‟ 
Civil Relief Act that Congress had passed in 1940. Even if all the states tried their best, they 
would still not be able to provide voting mechanisms that were as efficient and streamlined as a 
federal plan would.
138
 Roosevelt asked that the House vote on the Rankin bill be taken by a roll 
call so that the American People (and the servicemen) could check on their Congressmen. The 
response in Congress to the President‟s message was “white hot.”139 Resentment came from both 
Republicans and Democrats, in both houses of Congress.
140
 Not only did Congressmen feel that 
their executive was meddling in legislative matters, but they were also shocked by his choice of 
words. Calling the bill a fraud seemed to imply that those voting for a state plan were villains and 
crooks. Especially angered were the members of his own party in the Senate who had voted for 
the states‟ rights plan, several of whom were now considering voting for the compromise bill. 
Roosevelt‟s support of the federal plan to guarantee voting right for soldiers might therefore 
actually have discouraged Congress from passing Green-Lucas and Worley bills. 
On February 3, the House angrily accepted Roosevelt‟s challenge and stood up to be 
counted in a roll call that resulted in the passing of an amended version of the Eastland-Rankin 
bill. An angered New York Times editor argued that the roll call that had essentially amounted to 
a choice between a federal plan and a states‟ rights plan, showed that Republicans were hindering 
soldiers from voting simply because they feared that soldiers would vote Democratic.
141
 Of the 
131 congressional votes cast by Representatives from the Southern States (including the border 
states), 69 were cast in favor of the federal plan, while 62 were cast for the states‟ rights plan. Of 
the 193 republicans voting, 175 supported the states‟ rights plan, while only 18 supported the 
federal plan. In other words, had it been only up to the Southern representatives, the federal plan 
would have been passed (though by a narrow vote,) but had the question been left up to the 
Republicans, the state rights‟ plan would have won (on a ratio of practically 10 to 1.) The editor 
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of The New York Times concluded that the main force hindering federal soldier voting rights was 
not states‟ rights concerns but partisan concerns.142  
 On February 4, a tie vote blocked a motion to bring the House-amended Eastland-Rankin 
bill to the Senate floor.
143
 Senate concurrence would have completed action on a soldier voting 
bill. Instead, the Senate passed an amended version of the Green-Lucas compromise bill, on 
February 8.
144
 A House-Senate soldier voting conference was formed to find a compromise 
between bills passed. On March 7, they came to an agreement. The result was a bill that in the 
words of a Washington post article was clothed in “a states‟ rights straight jacket so tight that 
only a limited number of overseas servicemen and women and a few in this county could cast 
federal ballots.”145 Supporters of the federal plan were bitterly disappointed. President Roosevelt 
and several Congressmen including Green, Lucas, and Senate Majority Leader Barkley, 
questioned whether greater or fewer numbers of servicemen would get the opportunity to vote 
under the new compromise bill than under exiting law.
146
 Green said the bill only bore wage 
resemblance to his original bill. Though he was the Senate Election Chairman, he refused to 
present the conference report to the Senate, and assigning instead the task to one of the 
compromise supporters in the committee. Green, Lucas and Barkley voted against the states‟ 
rights compromise, and Green urged Roosevelt to veto the bill.
147
 Worley and other congressmen 
in favor of a strong federal plan were disappointed at the outcome of the House-Senate 
conference, but believed the compromise bill was better than nothing. Worley voted in favor of 
the bill. The bill was passed in the Senate by 47 to 31 vote on March 14, and in the House by 273 
to 111 vote on March 15.
148
 In the other camp, Rankin, who had voted in favor of the bill, was 
enthusiastic and said he had got what he wanted, and senator Overton of Louisiana was delighted 
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that the South could maintain white supremacy.
149
 Roosevelt considered vetoing the bill, and 
telegraphed the various state governors to ask if they would accept the Federal Write-in Ballot. 
According to the Atlanta Constitution, there was a chance that Roosevelt would veto the bill. The 
answers he got varied. In the end, Roosevelt did not use his veto powers, and the bill became law 
on April 1, 1944, though without the President‟s signature.150  
In the media, articles were written both in favor and in opposition to the newly passed 
amendments. When the Senate passed the compromise bill, The New York Times published an 
editorial titled “The Soldier Loses.”151The editor wrote that “a better plan, and one thoroughly 
consistent with constitutional requirements” could have been achieved by passing a version of the 
early Green-Lucas/Worley bills. One article in the Washington Post maintained that “this law is a 
turning point in the very deeps of government. It is the end of a trend long under way.”152 This 
trend he, the author of the article argued, was the reversal of the New Deal increase in federal 
powers (at the expense of the states,) and the author was content. William Gladstone of The 
Atlanta Constitution agreed with Roosevelt that the bill that had passed was a fraud on the 
members of the military.
153
 
 
The 1994 Amendments 
The 1944 amendments repealed all but the first two sections of the 1942 Soldier Voting Act. 
Several election procedures that had been mandatory for the states in 1942 were turned into 
recommendations, for instance acceptance of the post-card ballot applications printed and 
distributed by the Departments of War and Navy.
154
 The amendments established the United 
States War Ballot Commission and proscribed a federal write-in absentee ballot (which would 
eliminate the need for registration or ballot application,) something that Green, Lucas, and 
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Worley had worked for.
155
 However, each state would have to certify that it had a need for write-
in ballots, before such ballots could be used by soldiers from that state. In addition, the ballot 
would merely be used if a serviceman had following the rules and regulations of their respective 
states, but had not received the regular state ballot in time for it to be returned for counting.
156
 
Originally, Green, Lucas and Worley attempted to expand the list of persons eligible to vote 
under the Soldier Voting Act, by including civilians working for the United States and not 
affiliated with the Armed Forces. However, in an attempt to minimize opposition to their bills, 
they had excluded such civilians already in their proposed compromise bills.
157
 To sum up, the 
opponents of the federal plan had succeeded in assigning ballot distribution to the states who 
retained control of the absentee voting process, and could create laws and regulations as they 
wished, or at least that is how Congressmen like Rankin saw it. However, a report by the 
American Political Science Association later argued that every time a state did not provide 
enough transit time or in any other way made voting impossible for a serviceman (who was 
otherwise qualified to vote,) were in fact violating federal law. The two first section of the 
Soldier Vote were left unchanged, and these sections amounted to a general federal guarantee of 
the right to vote absentee for covered groups (who were otherwise qualified to vote under state 
laws.)
158
       
 
The Real Test: The 1944 Elections 
In the 1944 election, 9,225,000 persons of voting age had served in Armed Forces. Of these, 
4,487,540 had been reported as applying for ballots in 1944, and of these, only 2,691,160 had 
their ballots counted. In other words, while 60 percent of civilians of voting age had voted, 50 
percent of voting age servicemen had applied for ballots, and 30 percent of service men had 
succeeded in voting. The service vote was 5.6 percent of the total popular vote for president 
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(48,025,648.) There is no available revealing how many of the service votes were cast from 
overseas.
159
   
 The extent and importance of the service vote varied from state to state. According to the 
1952 American Political Science Association report, “most of the variation was probably due to 
differences in the constitutional, legal, administrative, and political situations in the respective 
States.”160 The six states with the poorest records of voting were all Southern or border states: 
Alabama, South Carolina, Delaware, Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi and Louisiana. The service 
vote was not more than 3 percent of the total vote cast for president in those states, compared to 
the national average of 5.6 percent. The top four states with the best records of voting were 
Georgia, Virginia, New Jersey and Wyoming. 
  While only 30 percent of servicemen had their ballots counted, their votes may have been 
significant in the very close election. According to The New York Times, no statistics are 
available that reveals exactly how many of the soldiers voted for the Democrats and how many 
voted for the Republicans, as most states did not canvass the civilian and soldier votes 
separately.
161
 However, in the seven states that did make official or “reliable unofficial” 
canvasses, the soldier vote favored the Democrats, more so than the civilian vote.
 162
 In total, the 
51.5 percent of civilian votes in these seven states went Democratic, compared to 59.3 percent of 
the soldier vote. In one of these states, New Jersey, the soldier vote overcame a slight lead by 
Roosevelt‟s opponent Governor Dewy in the civilian vote, and turned the states‟ electoral votes 
over to the Democrats. The 1944 election also helped the Democratic Party regain some of its 
House seats lost in the 1942 mid-term elections, and the soldier vote may have played a role in 
some of these races as well.
163
 
 It is difficult to ascertain how much the amended Soldier Voting Act could be thanked for 
the increase in the (recorded) number of soldiers who were able to vote.
164
 As already discussed, 
the main purpose of the Green-Lucas and Worley bills was to reduce the number of steps needed 
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to cast a ballot, by providing for a federal write-in absentee ballot. As also discussed, the final act 
had only provided for such a ballot as an emergency solution if ballots did not arrive. The 1952 
American Political Science Association report stated that the number of federal write-in absentee 
ballot counted in the 1944 election had been 85.000, an unimportant fraction of the total vote 
according to the association.
165
 Only 20 states had certified the use of the emergency ballot, and 
most of these states already had good voting laws. Among the seven states where service voting 
was most difficult, only Texas had approved the its use. The federal write-in ballot therefore 
seemed to have been a failure. However, American Political Science Association argued that the 
threat of the federal ballot might have given some states incentive for improving their own laws 
or administration of existing laws.
166
 It is natural to question whether the Soldier Voting Act 
helped more African Americans to vote. No available material answers this question, but it seems 
unlikely. As discussed above, among the states with the poorest results of soldier voting were 
several Southern states, and it was in the Southern states that discrimination against African-
Americans was most apparent. Also, as long as states could set their own time limits for 
forwarding ballots, for instance, a theoretical federal guarantee of the right to vote was of little 
help. 
2.3 Efforts Resulting in the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 
Congressional commitment to improving absentee voting for servicemen did not come to a close 
with 1944 election and the end of the Second World War. It became clear that the U.S. would 
continue to be a world military power with troops stationed abroad, and that the need for absentee 
voting for these as well as other groups would continue. The New York Times, for instance, 
continued to report that inadequacies in state absentee laws were deprived large numbers of 
servicemen of the vote, and several members of Congress as well as President Truman and 
President Eisenhower believed that Congress needed to take action.
167
 Arguments of protecting 
states‟ rights and the Constitution continued to hamper federal legislation on the subject.168 
However, judging by articles in The New York Times in the period 1945 to1955, and by the lack 
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of attention given to the soldier voting debates by the Congressional Digest (which had devoted 
two issues to the topic in 1944,) the relevant congressional policy discussions did not reach the 
same level of animosity or intensity as during debates in 1942 to 1944. 
 In 1946, Congress once more amended the Soldier Voting Act in an attempt to 
incorporate lessons learned from the 1944 election.
169
 The amendment was approved by President 
Truman.
170
 It contained 17 recommendations for the states. Two major changes were made to the 
existing law. First, the recommendations were made to apply in time of peace as well as in time 
of war, thought the war clause was kept for the first two sections regarding the general 
declaration of rights. Secondly, all provisions concerning the federal write-in absentee ballot 
were eliminated.
171
 Secretary Stimson had the year before turned to Congress and questioned 
whether it was justifiable to continue the federal write-in ballot program when so few servicemen 
had made use of it in the 1944 election.
172
 
 In 1950, the Korean War again put soldier voting on the congressional agenda. Several 
bills were considered. Two Republicans, Senators Bridges and Saltonstall, introduced a bill that 
would have reinstated the federal write-in ballot. A New York Times article dated August 21, 
1950 noted that Republicans believed that they would get better than an even break out of the 
ballots cast by servicemen.
173
 The latter bill was not passed, but two other were. H.R. 9399 
required in-hand delivery of post card ballot applications, as opposed to simply making them 
available, and H.R. 9455 recommended stats to reduce the weight of absentee voting material to 
minimize cost and promote speed of delivery. President Truman signed both bills on September 
29, 1950.
174
 
 Truman had voted in favor of the 1942 act. Although away on public business at the time 
the Senate passed the Eastland states‟ rights bill, he was reported as being against the latter 
measure.
175
 In 1944, together with Green and Lucas, he had voted against the states‟ rights 
compromise bill that eventually became law,
176
 not surprising perhaps, being Roosevelt‟s running 
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mate in the 1944 election (and as discussed, Roosevelt even considered vetoing the act.) In 1951, 
Truman asked the American Political Science Association (APSA) to conduct a study of the 
military voting issue and make recommendations for improving the situation. APSA created a 
Special Committee on Service Voting, and in 1952 it presented its findings in a report to the 
president. The report concluded that since 1944, the situation had become worse rather than 
better. In many states, legislation providing for service voting expired with the end of the Second 
World War, and over half the states had disregarded or overlooked the 1946 congressional 
recommendations for permanent legislation. Known deficiencies in state laws that would impede 
service voting in the 1952 general elections existed in 24 states, not counting an additional five 
states that had unclear laws.
177
 South Carolina and New Mexico for instance, had no provisions 
for absentee voting at all, and Texas did not allow members of the regular Armed Forces to vote. 
Some states did not accept the federal post card application for ballots, insisting on hand written 
letters or other special forms. Other states required in-person registration, a requirement difficult 
or impossible to meet for servicemen in training camps or overseas. Still others did not send 
ballots to the soldiers until 21 days or less before the last date of ballot counting, though based on 
experience, the Department of Defense recommended a time frame of no less than 45 days.
178
  
 The APSA commission made a series of recommendations for improving the military 
voting situation. It recommended that states enact legislation that would allow servicemen to vote 
without in-person registration, payment of poll taxes, or unreasonable literacy tests. Furthermore, 
servicemen should receive ballots in time, in other words no later than 45 days prior to the last 
date of ballot counting, receive all essential information concerning voting procedures, and all 
states should accept the federal post card application for ballots. These were recommendations 
already incorporated in the 1946 law (but that had been ignored by many states). The report did 
not seem to discuss or take sides on the matter of Congress‟ constitutional powers in the area of 
(soldier) voting and the limits thereof. However, the report noted that many states seemed to be 
breaking federal law. After all, the first two sections that had been kept since 1942 guaranteed 
servicemen the right to vote. When a state did not provide sufficient time for the return of a 
ballot, for instance, the state was in practice disenfranchising servicemen. Since no 
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disenfranchised serviceman had brought a lawsuit against his state on the grounds of those two 
provisions, Congress‟ constitutional limits on soldier voting were unknown, as were the exact 
legal implications of the act itself.
179
 Some of the members on the APSA commission urged 
Congress to require the full use of the federal write-in absentee ballot on the assumption that a 
case would be brought to court where the constitutional issue involved would be settled once and 
for all. Meanwhile, the APSA report also maintained that the best solution for soldier voting in 
the long run would be to leave the responsibility for election administration to the states, as had 
been “the tradition and accepted practice” (as opposed to saying: as dictated by the 
Constitution.)
180
 
 While the APSA commission believed soldier voting would be best resolved by state 
procedures, they still prescribed a role for the federal government. They recommended removing 
the words “in time of war” from the first two sections making the general statement concerning  
voting rights apply to peace time conditions.
181
 Furthermore, federal legislation should 
recommend that states extend servicemen‟s absentee voting laws to include their spouses and 
dependants, as well as civilians serving abroad who were either working for the Armed Forces or 
as civilians employed by the federal government, and the spouses and dependants of such 
civilians. The commission reported that no federal agency had been directed to remind the states 
of the Soldier Voting Act (and its amendments).
182
 The commission recommended that federal 
statute should require the secretary of defense, in cooperation with the attorney general, to bring 
to the attention of the states the federal recommendations and explain the need for action. 
Furthermore, the secretary of defense should report biennially to Congress on the extent to which 
states applied the recommendations. No statistics on the service vote were available from the 
1946, 1948 an 1950 elections, and it was therefore recommended that the secretary of defense in 
cooperation with the Bureau of Census be required to gather data to keep such records. The 
secretary of defense should also be required to maintain an effective information and educational 
program to acquaint servicemen with their rights. The commission also urged political parties and 
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other organizations interested in citizen participation in government to help encourage the states 
to take action.
183
  
 While the above recommendations were unanimously adopted, a majority of the APSA 
commission also recommended that the federal write-in absentee ballot be revived and used in 
the same manner as it had been in 1944, because the commission feared the states would not have 
time to change their laws in time for the 1952 election. However, such legislation should expire 
by the end of the year, so that states would get a chance to fix their own voting procedures in time 
of the 1954 elections. Finally, the commission agreed that the insufficiencies in soldier voting 
were merely symptomatic of greater problems in elections laws and practices. They therefore 
recommended the creation of a national bipartisan commission on voting to promote election 
reform in general.
184
 
 President Truman endorsed APSA commission‟s recommendations and delivered the 
report to Congress on March 29 (1952), together with his own comments. In his message he 
urged immediate action by both Congress and the states. He warned that many of the 2.500.000 
men and women of voting age now in the Armed Forces, many of whom were stationed overseas 
in Korea, Japan and Europe, would not have the opportunity to vote. As for the federal write-in 
absentee ballot he stated that: “in spite of the obvious difficulties in the use of the Federal ballot, 
the Congress should not shrink from accepting its responsibility and exercising its Constitutional 
powers to give the soldiers the right to vote where the states fail to do so.”185 While expressing 
his belief in the constitutionality of the federal write-in ballot, he also agreed with the 
commission that provisions for its use should expire before the general elections of 1954 as “the 
best and most effective way to assure our service people of their right to vote is through state 
action.”186 This was a somewhat milder approach to the federal government‟s involvement in 
soldier voting than that of his predecessor who had declared that no matter how hard the states 
tried, they still would not be able to provide as good a system of soldier voting as a federal plan 
with the general use of the federal write-in absentee ballot could.
187
 
                                                 
183
 American Political Science Association report 1952: 514. 
184
 See American Political Science Association report 1952: 514, 519. 
185
 “Text of Roosevelt‟s Message on Voting,” The New York Times, March 29, 1952. available at www.nytimes.com 
accessed June 10, 2010. 
186
 See previous footnote. 
187
 Franklin D. Roosevelt, letter to Congress on January 26, 1944, in Congressional Digest vol. 23, June-July 1944: 
186-187. 
44 
 
 Companion bills were introduced in the House and Senate, sponsored by two of the 
federal plan supporters of the 1940‟s: Senator Green (D-RI) and House Majority Leader 
McCormack (D-MA). All of the APSA commission‟s recommendations were included in the 
bills.
188
 On June 20, 1952, the Senate passed the bill. Green had attempted to make the federal 
government responsible for determining which states needed the federal write-in ballot, and make 
it mandatory for such states to accept it. However, the coalition of Republicans and Southern 
Democrats from 1940‟s continued their opposition. They succeeded in letting the governors of 
the various states certify as to the adequacy or inadequacy of their soldier voting laws, as they 
had in 1944.
189
 The bill was passed over to the House were hearings were convened. Truman 
again encouraged Congress to take action, and submitted his comments for the hearing records.
190
 
Despite the president‟s support, the House Subcommittee on Elections voted on July 3 to 
postpone any further action. The states also failed to take steps to facilitate soldier voting. 
According to the Armed Forces, only two states had made certain efforts: Michigan and Utah. 
However, at least by now all states had waived the poll tax for servicemen, except New Mexico 
and South Carolina that had laws prohibiting soldier voting Defense officials estimated that of the 
2,500,000 servicemen of voting age, about 1,000,000 would be deprived of their voting rights.
 191
  
    Eisenhower took over the presidency in 1953. A general during the Second World War, 
Eisenhower was one of the men who were been credited for their major contributions in aiding 
soldier voting in the 1944 elections, pushing the voting program set by the act of that year among 
his troops in Europe. Prior to the 1954 elections, he too addressed Congress to urge action on the 
soldier voting issue, his State of the Union Address being one of those occasions.
192
 More 
congressional hearings followed, but without any legislative results.
193
 Eisenhower followed up 
the next year, sending letters to the 48 state governors asking that they adopt uniform laws for 
servicemen overseas.
194
 The president noted that there would be an estimated 500,000 to 
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1,000,000 military personnel overseas in the 1956 elections, and that three quarters of the states 
did now not live up to the criteria established in World War Two deemed necessary for effective 
soldier voting. In other words, the situation seemed to be getting even worse than at the time the 
APSA commission had released its report three years earlier.
195
  
 Results finally came on August 9, as President Eisenhower signed the Federal Voting 
Assistance Act of 1955 which repealed the Soldier Voting Act.
196
 It was perhaps not coincidental 
that progress finally took place a time the White House was occupied by a Republican president 
and during peace time. Perhaps Eisenhower‟s commitment to the cause had eased Republican 
opposition, not immediately being associated with New Deal federal big government. Easing the 
passage of the act, however, was the fact that unlike the Soldier Voting Act, it did not contain any 
provision giving a general guarantee of absentee voting rights for soldiers (who were otherwise 
qualified to vote.) Furthermore, all provisions of the new act were recommendations as concerned 
the states. The repeal of the federal guarantee had no practical effect, however, since soldiers 
were dependent on effective procedures, not a theoretical right. In line with the APSA 
commission‟s recommendations, the Federal Voting Assistance Act established permanent 
federal responsibilities for ensuring the progress and maintenance of servicemen‟s right to vote. 
The act authorized the president to assign the head of any executive department or agency to 
coordinate and facilitate the federal responsibilities that the act would require, and the designee 
was authorized to request assistance from any of the other Departments or agencies. The 
presidential designee was required to report biennially to Congress on the federal administration 
of the act, on the progress of the states in carrying out the recommendations contained in the act, 
and provide statistical data relating to absentee voting. The designee was to annually request 
information from the states pertaining to election dates, officers to be elected, absentee 
registration and voting procedures etc. Agencies and departments affected by the act were to be 
given this information, and would in turn reprint and distribute such information to the extent 
necessary. The attorney general was to cooperate and advice with the Council of State 
Governments on the formulation of state laws implementing the act‟s recommendations, and the 
administrator of general services was to print and distribute post card ballot applications. 
Furthermore, following up on the APSA recommendations, the list of persons covered by the act 
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was extended to spouses and dependants of servicemen and civilians officially attached to the 
Armed Forces or working for the federal government overseas, and their spouses and dependents 
residing with or accompanying them. The act continued the recommendations pertaining to the 
post card ballot application, waiving registration for those who had been deprived of an 
opportunity to do so, delivery of ballots in time to be retuned before last day of counting, free 
U.S. Postage etc.
197
 Though states‟ rights congressmen had managed to leave out any provision 
for a federal ballot, and though the provisions concerning state action were still recommendations 
as opposed to requirements, the act set the framework for further federal voting reforms.
198
 
Eisenhower appointed the secretary of defense to be responsible for the administration of the act, 
and the Feral Voting Assistance Program that was established as a result of the act, has been 
based in the Pentagon ever since. 
 In 1955, Defense Department officials believed that a greater proportion of absentee 
servicemen would vote in the 1956 elections than ever before, according to The New York 
Times.
199
 The potential service vote was estimated to be 2,000,000 with an added 1,000,000 
counting the civilian vote overseas. Department officials expected that voting by servicemen 
would exceed the civilian national average which had been 62.7percent in the 1952 Presidential 
election. In 1952, only 15percent of servicemen of voting age had their ballots counted. The 
Defense Department‟s optimism of 1956 was based on improvements in state laws. Apart from 
New Mexico that still prohibited service voting (due to state constitutional provisions that were 
difficult to alter), all states accepted the federal post card ballot application. The federal post card 
was considered the most important single step for facilitating voting, as it promoted uniformity of 
data and procedure. Registration had been simplified in many states, some even automatically 
registering service personnel who qualified for a ballot, thus reducing the time factor. 
Improvements in state laws were accredited to the bi-partisan team that had been delegated the 
responsibility for operating the Federal Voting Assistance Program by the secretary of defense. 
The team delegates had traveled to the several states and urged the Governors and state 
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governments to implement the recommendations contained in the Federal Voting Assistance 
Act.
200
  
 Despite Defense Department optimism, only 35.2 percent of service men of voting age 
successfully cast a ballot in the 1956, according to The New York Times.
201
 This figure showed an 
improvement compared to the 1952 elections‟ 15percent, but not a significant improvement 
compared to the 1945 elections‟ 35percent which was the highest service vote so far. As will be 
discussed in the next chapters, state laws were still not adequate, and the transit time problem 
continued to be a major source of disenfranchisement.   
2.4 Conclusion 
In the 1940‟s and 1950‟s, states‟ rights concerns, fears of enfranchising African Americans, and 
partisan politics were all factors that prevented strong federal legislation to ensure that citizens 
would not be deprived of their voting rights because of military service. Roosevelt‟s outspoken 
support strengthened critics‟ belief that soldier voting bills represented new attempts by New 
Deal supporters to centralize power at the federal level. Many Southern members of Congress 
feared that federal soldier voting legislation would set a precedent for federal efforts at 
unraveling systematic discrimination of African Americans in election processes. Gallup polls 
indicating that the Democratic Party would gain from the service vote seem to have made many 
Republicans oppose efforts to help servicemen have their ballots counted. 
 Despite the federal guarantee of absentee voting rights for servicemen provided in the 
Soldier Voting Act (1942), problems persisted. A theoretical right to vote was of little use when 
procedures in many states made voting impossible to carry out in practice. Federal standards 
concerning ballot transit time, for instance, were merely recommendations, and several states 
continued to disenfranchise servicemen by forwarding ballots too late for their return in time for 
the election. It seems therefore that the repeal of the federal guarantee in 1955 when the Federal 
Voting Assistance Act was passed, did not represent a major setback. While merely 
recommending states to follow procedural standards provided in the act, Congress had extended 
its commitment to absentee voting rights to include certain groups of civilian citizens, in time of 
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peace as well as in time of war. The act recommended that states provide absentee voting 
procedures not only for servicemen in active duty, but to members of the merchant marine, 
federal employees overseas, members of religious groups and welfare organizations officially 
assisting the armed Forces, and to the spouses and dependent accompanying all those included in 
these groups.  
 The Federal Voting Assistance Act furthermore set the framework for future reform. The 
act resulted in the establishment of the Federal Voting Assistance Program, which would be a 
permanent body that would promote reform and come to the aid of absentee voters covered by 
the act. Among the factors that had encouraged congressional involvement in absentee voting 
rights for servicemen (and later civilians) was war (which had created the real need for such 
legislation,) popular opinion (that viewed soldiers as especially worthy of democratic rights) and 
the continued presence of peace time troops abroad. Support by Truman and Eisenhower, the first 
requiring a thorough study of the soldier voting situation, and the latter a Republican urging 
congressional action probably also served as factors encouraging change in policy.   
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- 3 - 
The 1960’s and 1970’s: Voting Rights of Overseas 
Civilians 
The 1940‟s and 1950‟s saw the struggle to enfranchise servicemen by granting them absentee 
voting rights guaranteed by the federal government. However, the United States was not quite 
ready for federal control within the sphere of voting. In the 1950‟s, the Federal Voting Assistance 
Act (FVAA) revoked the federal guarantee, and made instead a list of recommendations. Most 
states did adopt procedures to enfranchise their servicemen, though as discussed in chapter three 
and five, these procedures were in many states not adequate. This chapter discusses the change in 
policy during the 1960‟s and 1970‟s as concerned the enfranchisement of groups today covered 
by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). These two decades 
saw little change at the federal level in laws concerning servicemen. However, the FVAA had 
recommended that states also allow for absentee voting by federal government employees 
overseas as well as their spouses and dependents accompanying them, and in the late 1960‟s and 
the 1970‟s, Congress‟ new focus turned to civilians not employed by the U.S. government.  
This chapter explores how the context had changed dramatically from the time of the 
discussions concerning servicemen‟s absentee voting rights during the two previous decades. By 
the early 1970‟s, voting rights had become recognized as a core part of citizenship.202 Spurred in 
part by the civil rights movement and debates on black voting rights, limits to voting were being 
removed one by one through congressional legislation, constitutional amendments, and a 
sympathetic Supreme Court. This process resulted not only in something close to universal 
suffrage, but also constituted a nationalization of the franchise. This chapter explains how this 
new context eased the way for finally achieving federally guaranteed absentee voting rights for 
civilians overseas. Furthermore, this chapter discusses the substantial impact that overseas 
interest groups had in attaining absentee voting rights. Last but not least, a portion of this chapter 
is devoted to the constitutional debates concerning legislation specific to the voting rights this 
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group. Although debates were subdued compared to the ones concerning servicemen in 1940‟s 
and 50‟s, constitutional issues still threatened the passing of new legislation.  
3.1 A different Setting Promoting Change 
First of all, the expansion of absente voting rights to overseas civilians was spurred by the actual 
need for such legislation. After the Second World War, a stream of Americans began crossing the 
Atlantic for residence in Europe. These Americans were different from the iconic expatriates of 
the 1920‟s that Ernest Hemingway and Gertrude Stein depicted in popular literature. The latter 
were replaced by middle-class Americans attracted by the Marshall Plan reconstruction of 
Europe. Early arrivals included federal employees, but businessmen soon followed. Commercial 
ties that had existed before the war were rekindled and expanded, and U.S. exports to Europe 
became important for the American post-war economy. Safe under the NATO umbrella, all kinds 
of professionals followed suit: engineers, bankers, lawyers, accountants, advertisers, among 
others. Following the business community were students, teachers, artists, musicians, writers, 
missionaries, scientists, and fashion models. These were soon joined by an increasing number of 
retirees.
 203
   
In addition to all these civilians, a large number of troops were stationed overseas. 
However, by 1968, as Congress directed its attention to the voting problems of civilian American 
citizens overseas not employed by the federal government (from hereon also referred to as private 
citizens,) every state and the District of Columbia provided for absentee voting by military 
personnel.
 204 
Although two states still required in-person registration by members of the Armed 
Forces (and thus made it impossible for many service people to exercise this right,) most states 
had simplified procedures for registration and voting covering servicemen and their families. Half 
the states had met all recommendations of the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955. In contrast, 
23 states still required personal registration as a prerequisite for voting, absentee or otherwise, for 
citizens not covered by the act.  Three states, for instance, that provided for absentee voting for 
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certain categories of their citizens did not include civilians living abroad as one of them.
205
 In 
1968, a House report stated that a significant number of Americans temporarily residing abroad, 
an estimated 750,000 to 3 million, were deprived of their franchise.
206
  
 The domain of voting had been seen as one of the most important states‟ rights, when 
federal legislation guaranteeing soldier‟s (absentee) voting rights had first been brought up in the 
1940‟s. Many had feared that the latter legislation would set a precedent for federal intrusion into 
a prerogative of the states, and the White South in particular had feared it would set a precedent 
for the enfranchisement of African Americans.
207
 From the late 1950‟s till the early 1970‟s, 
however, both racial barriers and other kinds of limits to the franchise were dismantled. Keyssar 
writes that in this period, “the legal underpinnings of the right to vote were transformed more 
dramatically than they had been at any earlier point in the nation‟s history.”208 Federal acts, 
constitutional amendments, and Supreme Court decisions, all contributing to the end of the era of 
state control of the franchise.
209
 When the debates concerning voting rights bills aimed at 
overseas private citizens got going in Congress, such legislation no longer threaten the 
enfranchisement of blacks as they were already being enfranchised by other efforts, in fact 
something approaching universal suffrage ha been established. Voting rights were now regarded 
as a national concern. However, issues of states‟ rights had not disappeared, and they were still 
present in debates concerning private citizens‟ overseas voting rights, as is discussed later in this 
chapter.
210
  
 
The Legal Revolution  
What Keyssar calls “the legal revolution”, was in part kicked off by the civil rights movement. 
“[Black] citizens marched, rallied, boycotted buses, wrote petitions and filed law suits to 
challenge the Jim Crow laws that had kept them in their place for more than half a century.”211 
Voting rights was one of the issues that had always been at the heart of the civil rights movement. 
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Electing friendly minded people to fill post from everything to local sheriff to Congressmen, 
Senators and President would in turn help remove discrimination in other arenas as well. The 
civil rights movement soon realized that they needed the backing of the federal government, for it 
was near to impossible for the blacks to compel bigoted city and state officials to cease 
discrimination. The federal government was at first careful at getting involved. Democratic 
Presidents were for instance balancing their actions to try and keep both black and white voters in 
the South that had been the bastion of the Democratic Party. But in 1960 the pace of government 
activity began to speed up, in large part because the situation in the South was becoming 
increasingly intense. While the Civil Rights Act of 1957 had little effect in it self apart from 
getting the ball rolling, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did, and especially interesting for this thesis, 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a milestone in American political history.
212
 Among other 
things, the Voting Rights Act suspended literacy tests and other “devices” in states and counties 
where fewer than 50 percent of all adults had gone to the polls in 1964, a suspension that would 
have to be renewed after five years; authorized the attorney general to send federal examiners 
into the South to enroll voters; prohibit the governments of affected areas from changing their 
electoral procedures without approval (“preclearance”) from the Department of Justice or a 
federal court in Washington. It was a milestone not only because a million more African 
Americans were registered within a few years of the bill. But also because it meant that Congress 
was no longer succumbing to opposition against federal involvement in what had for so long been 
seen as a prerogative of the states, though in fact, the act was in essence an attempt at enforcing 
Fifteenth Amendment passed a century earlier. The act was regularly renewed and revamped and 
is still operative today.    
 Debates on black voting rights had a positive effect on efforts to eradicate other types of 
restrictions to the franchise. If it was wrong to discriminate against African Americans, other 
types of restrictions should also fall. Some broadenings of the franchise were enabled by 
constitutional amendments. Washington D.C. was awarded electoral votes by the Twenty-third 
Amendment in 1961, and in 1973, the city was given home rule by a federal act.
213
 The city, with 
an African American majority, had been governed by a federal commission until it in 1973 got an 
elected major and city council. The Soldier Voting Act had been the first federal act to restrict the 
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use of poll taxes, part of what made the Soldier Voting debates so controversial, dealt with in 
chapter two. Meanwhile, further constitutional discussions did not manage to kill the opposition 
claiming federal acts banning poll taxes in general were outside the limits of Congress‟ powers. 
In 1964 however, the poll tax was finally banned in federal elections by the Twenty-fourth 
Amendment. Another restriction that would be changed was the voting age. Every time there had 
been a war, including the Second World War, there had been calls to reduce the lower voting age 
limit from 21 to 18, the draft age. The argument was that if a man was old enough to give their 
live in battle, he was old enough to vote for the government they are most satisfied to fight for. 
None of the attempts had succeeded. But the continued presence of a cold war peace time army, 
the Korean War, and most importantly the unpopular Vietnam War, forced the issue to become a 
high priority. The lack of political rights of a large portion of the troops served to underscore the 
lack of democratic support to the Vietnam War. The voting age was reduced to 18 as part of the 
renewed Voting Rights Act package of 1970. While the Supreme Court upheld Congress‟ setting 
the voting age in federal elections, it maintained that the states could set the voting age in state 
and local elections. To avoid problems of having to register voters separately for federal and state 
elections, Congress passed the Twenty-sixth Amendment in 1971, fixing the voting age for all 
elections.  
 Another way in which the franchise was broadened, was the removal of lengthy residency 
requirements in presidential elections, as well as requiring the states to allow all citizens to vote 
absentee in presidential elections, who were “otherwise qualified.” This was achieved without 
much controversy through section 202 of the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act. It had a 
direct impact on the discussions concerning voting rights for overseas private citizens, as is 
discussed in greater detail in the next subchapter. One year residency in a state was at the time the 
amendments were passed the norm before a person could qualify to vote in that state, with shorter 
timeframes required in precincts and counties. According to one estimate, as many as 15 million 
people were kept from voting in the 1962 election because of such laws.
214
 Section 202 
prohibited states from imposing more than thirty-days of residency in presidential elections, and 
required that anyone who had moved less than thirty days prior to a presidential election be 
allowed to vote in their previous state of residence. Keyssar lists several reasons for the success 
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passing of this part of the amendment.
215
 In addition to simply being the right thing to do, 
abolishing lengthy residency requirements that were unjust and undemocratic, it was a safe and 
uncontroversial measure to respond to rising concerns of low voter turnout. As part of the Nixon 
administration‟s package of amendments to the Voting Rights Act, it was perhaps also a 
deliberate measure to present the Republican Party as actively pursuing universal suffrage and 
national reforms. Finally, the passing of the bill might also have been eased by the fact that while 
mobile voters had previously been overrepresented by workers, the middle and upper classes had 
begun to take over that role. In other words, the class of citizens that residency rules had 
previously been designed to screen out had now been replaced by a more respectable one. Section 
202 was upheld in Oregon v. Mitchell (1970) (along with the two other sections of the 
amendment suspending literacy tests nationwide and establishing a voting age of eighteen in all 
federal elections). Section 202 was upheld based on several parts of the Constitution, in short 
pointing both to such legislation being a discretionary power of Congress and that the restrictions 
that section 202 aimed at eliminating were unconstitutional. Two years later, in Dunn v. 
Blumstein, the Court even took an additional step by maintaining that Tennessee‟s residency rules 
for state elections were also unconstitutional. And this was not the first time the Court had 
scrutinized residency rules. In fact already in 1965, in Carrington v. Rash, the Court had 
overturned a Texas law that prohibited servicemen from establishing voting residence unless they 
had been registered in that state before entering into service. The Court ruled that it was 
unconstitutional to rule out a segment of the population from voting based on occupation.              
 Goldwater, the senator essentially responsible for section 202 of the amendments, had 
intended that the provisions concerning absentee voting would also cover private citizens living 
abroad. He had argued on the Senate floor that  
 
millions of Americans are denied a voice in choosing their President and Vice President merely 
because they are exercising their constitutional right to interstate commerce. This category of 
citizens not only includes those Americans who travel within the United States for various 
reasons, but it also encompasses a great many Americans who are temporarily outside the United 
States. They may be serving overseas as Foreign Service officers or other government civil 
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servants. They might be students who are attending foreign colleges. They include Americans 
who are working for U.S. businesses that have branches abroad.
216
  
Goldwater‟s statement gave hope to those who were struggling to enfranchise Americans 
overseas. But while Goldwater had expressly included overseas civilians as a target group for 
section 202 when he was defending his bill in Congress, the bill itself did not expressly name 
them. Section 202 by would be a disappointment to this group of citizens. However, the Voting 
Rights amendment of 1970 and the court rulings that ensued as a result of the amendment,   
served as a basis for the discussions concerning overseas civilians voting rights.
 217
 
 As already mentioned, the Supreme Court played an important role in the general 
broadening of the franchise in the period between the late 1950‟s and early 1970‟s. The Court, 
both “reflecting and reinforcing the popular mood, broke new doctrinal ground through its 
embrace of democracy as a core constitutional value.”218 The Warren Court took on the role as 
the guardian of formal democratic rights. While the Court had previously interpreted the 
Constitution in a more narrow fashion, it was now finding bits and parts throughout the 
Constitution that could be interpreted in a way that would benefit attempts at democratizing 
voting in the U.S., and it found the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be a 
particularly useful weapon.
219
 
 Easing the efforts at broadening the franchise in general was the fact that they took place 
during a time when the ideological climate made it hard to deny them. The U.S. presented it self 
as the front bearer of democratic ideals, fighting communism and oppression, and limits on the 
franchise therefor became harder to justify.  The television also helped shape public opinion. It 
brought for instance the violence of the White South against African American into the homes of 
people in the entire nation. Both major political parties saw more to gain than to loose from 
extending the franchise. The Voting Rights Act for instance, had in 1965 been passed by a great 
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majority. Though a few conservative Republicans and Southern Democrats had voted against it, 
most realized that the bill would pass sooner or later, and that it would be politically wise to have 
supported it.
 220
 
3.2 The Condition of Voting Rights for Overseas Private Citizens 
The Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 had extended Congress‟ commitment to voting rights 
of absentee military personnel to include overseas federal employees and their spouses and 
dependents.
221
 In 1968, Congress extended this commitment even further. On June 18, President 
Lyndon B. Johnson signed two bills amending FVAA into law, S. 2884 and S. 1581.
222
 S. 2884 
recommended the states to provide absentee registration and voting procedures to all citizens 
temporarily residing aboard. S. 1581 was aimed at improving voting procedures.
223
 Because the 
FVAA and its 1968 amendments continued to merely provide recommendations for the states, 
not all states followed up. Furthermore, several states interpreted the new amendments as a 
recommendation to exclude overseas citizens who did not know when or if they would return to 
the district in which he or she had been eligible to vote. Many overseas private citizens continued 
to find it difficult, confusing, or impossible to vote in federal elections. Problem arose not merely 
because states did not provide procedures for registering or voting absentee. Hypothetically 
speaking, even if a state had no absentee voting procedures, a member of the military in the 
1940‟s could have traveled from the battlefront to the home state, first one time to register, and 
then on Election Day to cast a ballot (if that person was otherwise qualified to vote.) However, 
such “voting vacations” would in most cases not have enfranchised the private overseas citizen 
(in the 1960‟s and 1970‟s.) Problems arose because states had strict laws concerning the 
definition of residency and which determined who could be allowed to register in a particular 
state. Causing confusion was also the fact that there were fifty-one different such interpretations 
of residence.
224
 Many states required the maintenance of a home or other abode in a state, and 
some required that voters physically lived in the state, or had confusing laws that appeared to 
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have such requirements. In 1975, all states and the District of Columbia, required that all private 
citizens abroad declared, and in many cases provided proof, that they intended to return to the 
state, in order to register and vote in federal elections. Persons who could not honestly declare so, 
would risk committing perjury. In other words, the assumption was that the private citizen abroad 
did not retain a state as his or her voting domicile unless he or she could prove otherwise. By 
1973, in contrast, a voter who was a serviceman, dependent of a serviceman, federal employee 
overseas, or a dependent of the latter, would in most states retain the state they last resided in as 
their voting domicile, even if it was highly unlikely that such persons would return to that 
state.
225
  
     By 1975, 28 states and the District of Columbia had heeded to the 1968 amendment by 
passing legislation explicitly providing for absentee registration and voting for overseas private 
citizens who could honestly declare that their absence was merely temporary.
226
 But even in some 
of these states and D.C., absentee registration for such citizens seemed ambiguous. Twelve other 
states, had general statutes allowing for absentee registration and balloting, but did not have 
explicit provisions for the overseas private citizen.
227
 Many of these twelve states had particularly 
stringent residency requirements. Another eight states seemed to allow for absentee balloting, but 
required in-person registration, by such citizens.
228
 Many of these eight states also had 
burdensome residency requirements. Finally, two states required in-person registration and 
balloting by overseas private citizens. Although the two latter states were Alabama and 
Louisiana, the other Southern states were spread across the other three categories described 
above.
229
 It is difficult to draw any other conclusions as to which areas of the country had the best 
laws based on the above information, as other factors influenced the quality of state overseas 
voting laws, such as how long before an election the state would forward ballots. In addition, 
variations did not merely exist between states but within the states. Local election boards were 
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the ones who interpreted the state laws, and were the ones who accepted or dismissed the 
individual registration and ballot applications. One New York Times article, for instance, gave 
voice to a group of New Yorkers living in Mexico who were angry because some upstate 
counties were honoring registration request while New York City election boards were not.
230
 
This situation was unfair and unpredictable, they argued. In fact, New York State seemed to be 
one of the more troublesome of the states as concerns determining residency for voting 
purposes.
231
 
As noted earlier, the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights Act had included a provision 
that required states to provide all voters with absentee procedures for doing so in presidential 
elections. Overseas citizens hoped that they would too be covered by this law. Prior to the 1972 
election, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce printed and distributed Guide to Absentee Voting in 
Presidential Elections: in the United States and Overseas.
232
 The guide maintained that all 
overseas citizens had finally been enfranchised, at least in presidential elections. It based this 
belief on the statement of Senator Goldwater on the Senate floor in 1970 defending the bill that 
would become section 202 (the statement that has been quoted earlier in the chapter,) as well as 
on a Justice Department interpretation of the 1970 amendments from May 1971. The Justice 
Department document (included in the brochure) stated that  
Under section 202, each state must provide that any otherwise qualified person who expects to be 
away from his election district on election day (and who complies with the applicable time 
requirements) may vote by absentee ballot. Accordingly, state laws which restrict availability of 
absentee ballots to certain classes of citizens or persons absent for particular reasons may not be 
enforced with respect to voting for President and Vice President. […] Anyone otherwise qualified 
to vote by absentee ballot for President and Vice President must be given the opportunity, if 
necessary, to register absentee.
233
  
The guide prepared by the Chamber of Commerce, which also gave detailed information 
regarding state deadlines and absentee procedures, was distributed to “the Governor, the 
Secretary of State, and the Attorney General of each state, and to the chief election official of 
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each county in the nation. At least 4000 copies were distributed to state and county officials 
alone. Many additional thousands of copies were sent to all American Chambers of Commerce 
abroad, to all U.S. based corporations and organizations with representatives overseas, and to 
Countless citizens here and abroad. Copies were likewise distributed through the U.S. State 
Department to embassies and consulates the world over, the Commerce Department, and its 
offices here and abroad and to the Department of Defense.”234  
Senators Goldwater and Pell supported the view presented by the Chamber of Commerce. 
The states, however, continued to decline overseas voters‟ registration applications. The 
overwhelming majority of states declined to accept the legislative history of 1970‟s amendments 
as sufficient for overruling their own state laws, and maintained that they were entitled to 
determine what an “otherwise qualified person” implied. Confusion followed, and newspapers 
did not seem to agree on whether overseas voters had been enfranchised in presidential elections 
or not.
235
 In a letter dated March 13, 1972, the Justice Department supported the states in their 
view, which, at least in the eyes of the overseas interest groups, meant that the department was 
reversing its May 1971 statement.
236
 Furthermore, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York also considered the question of whether the 1970 amendments could limit a 
state‟s power to define bona fide residency, in Hardy v. Lomenzo.237 The court did not accept 
Senators Goldwater and Pell‟s legislative history to interpret the 1970 amendments, and said the 
question should be dealt with by the legislature and not by the court. In the end then, the 1970 
amendments did in the end little to enfranchise overseas Americans in the 1972 election. 
3.3 Congressional Response 
In 1973, hearings were held in the Senate to evaluate two similar bills that would guarantee all 
Americans living overseas the right to register and vote in federal elections even if such citizens 
were not “domiciled or otherwise residing in such state or district and [did] not have a place of 
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abode or other address in such a state or district”.238 Overseas citizens would be allowed to vote 
in the state in which they were last registered to vote, or if they had not been registered, in the last 
state in which they resided prior to moving abroad. But the bills were not passed, and new 
hearings were held in the House in 1975.
239
 While the general broadening of the franchise had 
removed many of the obstacles to passing such legislation, overseas civilians‟ voting right bills 
still met opposition. Too be sure, this opposition seems to have been relatively mild, at least 
compared to that against the soldier voting bills in the 1940‟s and 1950‟s.240 Opposition was 
mainly based on constitutional arguments insisting that it was the states‟ prerogative to determine 
who qualified as a resident of the state, or even that the constitution itself explicitly stated that a 
bona fide resident of a state was someone who physically lived in that state (see discussions 
concerning the constitutional arguments in a later subchapter.) Some opponents also argued that 
absentee registration and voting would cause problems of fraud and be detrimental to the election 
process.  
However, one of the biggest challenges in getting these bills passed was simply raising 
enough interest for them in Congress. First of all, disenfranchised overseas Americans were for 
the time being not part of any constituency, and so interest in helping them would be based on 
their potentiality as future voters. Furthermore, overseas Americans were not a visibly oppressed 
group of society that raised sympathy among the general public, and so members of Congress 
would probably not gain in popularity among the general public by helping the group. (In 
contrast, members of Congress who had opposed federal absentee voting legislation covering 
military voters during the Second Word War had been in an uneasy position since popular 
opinion favored giving this group voting rights.) In fact, some views of overseas Americans 
included the image of them being “mink swathed tax evaders living it up at the French Riviera” 
who had abandoned the U.S.
241
 A representative of the Justice Department testifying in the 1973 
hearings, stated that “Regardless of the constitutional considerations with respect to S. 2102 and 
S. 2384, it seems basically unfair to permit a person residing abroad, who in many cases pays no 
federal, state or local taxes and who may have no knowledge of or interest in the state or district 
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in which he was formerly domiciled to cast votes in that State or district.”242 While the 
congressional debates centered around issues of constitutionality (and fraud,) one can perhaps not 
rule out the possibility that such policy views hid behind the constitutional concerns. 
On the other hand, one factor that probably made policy discussions concerning overseas 
citizens‟ absentee voting rights less acrimonious than the discussions concerning military voting 
rights in the 1940‟s, was the fact that no one seemed to know the size or political leaning of the 
overseas civilian vote.
243
 As noted in chapter two, polls in 1943 indicated that the service vote 
would be clearly Democratic and that it could potentially determine the close 1944 elections. One 
delegate representing overseas Americans at the 1974 National Democratic (midterm) 
Convention said he believed that the large American business contingent living abroad was 
mostly Republican, while the students, artists and others were mostly Democratic.
244
 But there 
was no reliable data as to exactly how many private citizens (of voting age) lived overseas, where 
they lived, and what they where doing abroad. The Department of Defense could keep track of 
servicemen and their dependent living abroad, and the State Department could keep track of its 
employees and their dependents, but how could one keep track of other Americans overseas? 
American citizens were recommended but not required to register at embassies in the countries 
they had moved to. Attempts at surveying overseas private citizens were made by the Federal 
Voting Assistance Program within the Department of Defense, by the Department of State, and 
by the Census Bureau within the Department of Commerce. However, such attempts were highly 
unscientific.
245
 When, for instance, the Census Bureau attempted to count overseas private 
citizens in 1970, they relied on such citizens to make voluntary trips to embassies or consulates to 
fill out census forms. Although the Bureau asked Foreign Service personnel to use all means 
possible to contact all overseas Americans, reports showed that few citizens abroad ever heard of 
the census and that even fewer attempted to complete the forms. As census numbers are used for 
apportionment, overseas private citizens were therefore left out of the official Census Bureau 
statistics, whereas servicemen, federal employees, and the dependents of both groups were 
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included in the apportionment calculations.
246
 However, 750,000 was the estimated number of 
American citizens abroad in a nongovernmental capacity, and of voting age, that figured in the 
1970 congressional discussions.
247
 In any case, the lack of adequate information on the size and 
political tendencies of the overseas civilian vote must have removed some of the Republican 
fears that had hindered stronger federal military voting bills from passing in the 1940‟s. 
Overseas American‟s voting rights bills in the 1970‟s were clearly bipartisan in 
sponsorship, but the opposition was still made up of Republicans and Southern Democrats.
248
 
Charles E. Wiggins (R-CA) seems to have been the most vociferous opponent, along with three 
other House Republicans.
249
 As already mentioned, opponents were backed up by the Department 
of Justice that testified against the constitutionality of the bills, and they were even backed by the 
Congressional Research Service.
250
 Proponents in Congress included Rep. Wayne L. Hays (D-
OH), Chairman of the Committee on House Administration that was responsible for handling the 
bill, who was considered as one of the most powerful men in Congress at the time. Also a 
proponent was Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) (who had been the Republican candidate in the 1964 
presidential election, and House minority leader John Rhodes (R-AZ).
251
 Proponents in Congress 
were supported by former Assistant Solicitor General and former Deputy Attorney General 
Nathan Lewin who testified in favor of the constitutionality of the bill, and by interest groups of 
overseas Americans, including future president and former chairman of the Republican National 
Committee, George W. H. Bush.
252
 According to Eugene Marans, the lawyer leading the overseas 
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interest groups‟ lobbying in Washington, the main reason for supporting overseas voting 
legislation was that it seemed like the right thing to do.
253
 
While Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower had personally got involved in the issue of 
absentee voting rights for servicemen, there is no available material that shows direct personal 
involvement by Lyndon B. Johnson or Nixon (or Ford.) In a letter to the chairman of the house 
committee that was considering amending the FVAA to recommend that states also provide 
absentee voting procedures for non-governmental overseas citizens, dated April 2, 1968, the 
Justice Department stated that it would have no objection to such a bill. However, it believed that 
such an amendment would have very little effect.
 255
 Under Nixon, the Justice Department 
opposed the federal guarantee of voting rights of citizens residing abroad, and it very likely that 
the department reflected the views of Nixon. However, according to Eugene Marans, Nixon had 
not personally involved himself in the issue, and that it was in fact the Justice Department, and in 
the end Antonin Scalia, in particular, who was trying to advise Nixon to veto what became the 
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act.
256
 
3.4 The Influence of Interest Groups 
One factor promoting change in policy concerning the voting rights of overseas Americans was 
the efforts of overseas Americans themselves. Interest groups of overseas Americans included the 
Bipartisan Committee for Absentee Voting (for overseas Americans), Democrats Abroad, 
Republicans Abroad, the Ambassadors Committee on Voting by Americans Overseas, Federation 
of American Women‟s Clubs Overseas (FAWCO), National Council of Churches of Christ in the 
United States (who had missionaries etc. overseas), the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs 
Department (who also had missionaries etc. overseas), and the Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States.
257
 These interest groups were well organized, backed by the U.S. business 
community, they were bi-partisan or non-partisan, memberships overlapped, and they seem to 
have worked very much in unison. Efforts at raising the issue of voting rights for overseas private 
citizens had already started in the 1950‟s by, among others, FAWCO and by the Council of 
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Americans Resident Abroad, an organization established in Mexico. But it was from the mid-
1960‟s (and especially from the early 1970‟s) and onwards, that efforts gained momentum and 
met success, and these efforts were mainly organized by Americans in Europe.
258
 
The arguments for granting overseas citizens the right to vote in federal elections made by 
the different groups were much the same.
259
 They argued that overseas Americans were an asset 
to the U.S., and that they deserved to be treated as such. They argued that many overseas 
Americans were employed by U.S. firms and that they helped increase exports. Furthermore, all 
overseas citizens acted as unofficial ambassadors spreading American ideas and values during a 
cold war in which the U.S. was attempting to win the harts and minds of the world‟s populations, 
the interest groups argued.
260
 They attempted to convince Congress that they were “real” 
Americans, that they had not abandoned the U.S. simply by moving abroad, that they were 
indeed well informed of U.S. affairs by reading American newspapers available overseas and by 
keeping in touch with family and friends still in the U.S. One representative of the National 
Council of Churches of Christ in the United States pointed out that their missionaries overseas 
had an average level of education well above the U.S. average, and that they thus were probably 
equally more likely to take an interest in keeping themselves informed of U.S. politics.
261
 
Furthermore, while they were not interested in voting in state and local elections to choose the 
local sheriff or dog catcher, they were still interested in and affected by national issues like Social 
Security, trade and tariff measures, export controls, foreign policy decisions, taxation, citizenship 
issues etc. They explained how not only were they deprived of the right to vote, but they were in 
essence also deprived of representation. Who would they turn to if they wanted to send letters of 
protest on some issue when no member of Congress could look at them as supporters or part of 
their constituency? In other words, who would represent their interest in Congress? They pointed 
out that it seemed unfair to discriminate in voting based on occupation, as states did by allowing 
persons employed by the federal government but not by private businesses register and vote 
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absentee. They insisted they had a democratic and constitutional right to vote, and reminded 
Congress that they were taxpayers with no representation. Furthermore, they pointed out that the 
number of private citizens of voting age overseas equaled the number of voting age citizens in 
some states, and that the overseas voting problem therefore was not insignificant. At a time when 
there was much talk of doing something about low voter turnout, they argued, it was ironic that 
one group of citizens who were actively demonstrating a desire to vote should be prevented form 
doing so.
262
  
  The Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting seems to have been one of the most 
significant organizations that successfully lobbied Congress and the Justice Department. It had 
been founded in Paris in 1965 by the overseas leaders of the European Democratic and 
Republican party committees, Alfred A. Davidson and Harvey S. Gerry. By 1975, it had included 
the Ambassadors Committee for Voting by Americans Overseas, which was made up of former 
ambassadors like Hon. Sargent Shriver, Hon. Gerard C. Smith (Nixon‟s ambassador in charge of 
the SALT negotiations) and George H.W. Bush, former chairman of the Republican Party and 
future president.
263
 In 1969, the Bipartisan Committee contacted American firms in France to 
cover the $6000 cost of an amicus curiae brief in a Supreme Court case.
264
 The case in question 
was Hall v. Beals. It did not deal directly with overseas voters, but it dealt with the issue of 
residency requirements for voting. By the time it reached the Supreme Court, however, the case 
was rendered moot.
265
  
In 1973, the Bipartisan Committee opened an office in Washington D.C. under the 
leadership of J. Kevin Murphy, then president of Purolator Services, and later president of the 
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U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The Committee asked Eugene Marans of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & 
Hamilton, a lawyer who himself had lived and worked abroad, to take the lead in their efforts to 
get a bill though Congress. For two years, Marans worked pro bono, preparing statements for 
congressional hearings, contacting members of Congress and the Department of Justice, etc. By 
1975, the Bipartisan Committee had got corporate sponsors, and was affiliated to many other 
organizations, including the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
266
 The backing of the Chamber of 
Commerce was probably important, being one of the most important lobbying groups in U.S., 
representing the interests of American businesses of all sizes, abroad and in the U.S., as well as 
state, local and overseas chambers of commerce, and industry associations. Testifying in the 
congressional hearings in the 1970‟s, William G. Whyte,  a representative for the Chamber of 
Commerce (and vice president of the Unites States Steel Corporation), expressed that “The 
National Chamber has long held that maintenance of individual freedom and our political 
institutions necessitates broad-scale participation by citizens, including business and 
professional people, in the selection, nomination, and election of public officeholders.”267 As 
already noted, the Chamber of Commerce published in 1972 a 40-page Guide to Absentee Voting 
in Presidential Elections: in the United States and Overseas.  
 Another organization that was affiliated to the Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting, 
and that worked closely with it, was the Association of American Residents Overseas (AARO). 
Americans Overseas did not only face problems when it came to voting. Other problems included 
the loss of citizenship (especially by American women marrying men of other nationalities and 
living abroad), difficulties in passing on American citizenship to children born abroad, exclusion 
of overseas Americans from MEDICARE, and double taxation. In 1993, Jean Archbold, Sonja 
Mincbere and  Helen Raoul-Duval, and later joined by Phyllis Michaux, returned to Paris from 
Federation of American Women‟s Clubs Overseas (FAWCO) conference and decided the time 
was ripe to create a new organization that would deal with issues like the ones just described, and 
AARO was born. The four women agreed that the first issue that should be dealt with was voting 
rights. If overseas Americans were enfranchised, it would be much easier to persuade members of 
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Congress to follow through with the rest. The founders choose a man to head the organization, so 
that it would not be perceived as being limited to “women‟s issues.”268   
AARO staged a letter writing campaign to influence members of Congress. AARO had 
put together a mailing list of American social clubs, churches, press correspondents, veterans‟ 
clubs etc. Marans, working for the Bipartisan Committee in Washington, would fax information 
on congressional action on the relevant bills to his law firm‟s branch in Paris. The Paris branch 
would call Michaux at the Chamber of Commerce which was lending its administrative facilities 
to AARO. Within a couple of hours, Michaux would type up and send a news flash to key 
persons around Europe who would in turn inform others. Michaux comments that in the days 
before the Internet, this would qualify as a fast information flow. Adds in the International 
Herald Tribune would supplement the news flashes titled: “More Letters to Mathias,” “Focus on 
Frenzel,” “Calling All Californians,” Wiggins is Wavering,” and “Your Letters Are Working.”269 
In 1975, ARRO also came up with a gimmick to make the letter writing easier. The following 
cover letter was prepared: “In 1973, there was a Tea Party because of no Representation. In 1975, 
we mail you this tea bag because of the Overseas Citizen‟s Voting Rights Act. So that in 1976, 
we will be able to vote for you. Support H.R.-3211 and S.-95.” ARRO sent a copy to everyone on 
the mailing list and urged them to send such a letter with a tea bag stapled to it, to their potential 
Congressmen. As the bill passed later that year, Representative Hays (D-OH), chairman of the 
House Administration Committee, pointed out that the committee had received a great number of 
letters from persons supporting the overseas citizens‟ voting rights bills, in fact a substantially 
greater number of letters than on any other issue that year.
270
 
 Overseas party committees had throughout the 1960‟s held election campaigns directed at 
servicemen, people working for aid organizations, federal employees, the dependents of the latter 
groups, as well as private citizens (some of whom had been enfranchised by the states after the 
1968 amendments to the FVAA.) During the 1972 presidential campaign, one could read in the 
news of Nixon dinners in Rome and McGovern picnics in Berlin, and distribution of leaflets for 
both candidates outside the University College in Dublin. One New York Times article read “If 
the Nixon campaign is muted – and largely restricted to fund raising dinners and half-page ads in 
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The International Herald Tribune – the McGovern overseas drive is a clutter of noisy rock parties 
as well as luncheons, auctions and concerts. Lee Remick, James Jones, Tony Curtis, Mary 
McCarthy, Irvin Shaw and Patricia Kennedy Lawford have helped the campaign overseas 
together with students, lawyers, some businessmen and young tourists.”272 While competing for 
votes, the Democratic Party Committee Europe and its Republican counterpart had joined forces 
and worked through the Bipartisan Committee to enfranchise all civilian Americans abroad, as 
described above. But they also lobbied their respective parties directly.
273
 In 1972, a delegation of 
overseas Americans was allowed to participate at that year‟s Democratic National Convention as 
non-voting observers. Two years later, a delegation of six under the banner of “Democrats 
Abroad” was given official participant status with two votes, the same number of votes given to 
the Canal Zone delegation. (Two years later the Democrats Abroad was given three votes.) The 
delegation paid its own way to the convention. Officially, the overseas delegates were there to 
help the Democratic Party find unity and a new charter, but they spent a good part of their time 
lobbying for federal legislation that would enfranchise all Americans living abroad. The 
Republican Party was not as welcoming to their overseas members, and it would take till well 
after the passage of the Overseas Voting Rights Act before an overseas delegation was allowed to 
participate in Republican National Conventions.
274
    
While one could find newspaper articles dealing with congressional action on overseas 
voting rights bills and with party campaigning abroad, the media coverage was muted compared 
to the 1940‟s. Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections, Claiborne Pell, 
urged the interest groups testifying in the congressional hearings to inform the public and raise 
awareness of the overseas voting rights problem, as few other than those affected were even 
aware of it, and complained that the domestic press did too little to highlight the problem.
275
 The 
overseas press, on the other hand, was more helpful. Michaux argues that the campaign staged by 
the overseas interest groups owed a great deal to the space given to the issue in the International 
Herald Tribune by its helpful editor Murray Weiss. According to Michaux, the articles in the 
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Tribune were important both because they kept overseas Americans all over the world informed 
of interest groups‟ efforts (and how to contribute to such efforts,) and because they gave 
legitimacy to the campaign.
276
 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly how important the interest groups‟ campaigning was for 
getting an overseas voting rights bill though Congress. However, judging by available material, 
their efforts seem to have been quite important. The backing of the Chamber of Commerce, for 
instance, can not have gone unnoticed. The extent of involvement by overseas groups and 
individuals in writing letters to the relevant committees and members of Congress, testifying in 
congressional hearings, etc., must at least have convinced Congress of the difficulties of overseas 
voting, and of the interest of overseas Americans in the staying a part of the U.S. while living 
abroad. The House report accompanying the bill that passed and enfranchised overseas civilians 
read “It was plain from testimony in the hearings that Americans outside the United States 
possesses both the necessary interest and the requisite information to participate in the selection 
of Senators and Congressmen back home.”277 The interest groups themselves do not doubt that it 
was thanks to their efforts that Congress finally enfranchised overseas Americans in 1975.
278
 This 
view is in fact backed by political scientist Taylor E. Dark III, as well as by Andrew Ellis writing 
for the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance‟s handbook for external voting: “The 
United States provides an example of those rare cases where external voting was finally enacted 
in response to the demands of citizens residing overseas (in 1975).” 279 
3.5 The Constitutional Debate 
Discussions concerning the constitutionality of the bills aimed at enfranchising overseas 
Americans in the 1970‟s (which were in essence identical,) were different from the discussions 
concerning voting rights bills for servicemen introduced in the 1940‟s and 1950‟s. First of all, the 
new debates were not as fiercely antagonistic and did not raise the same amount of interest as 
earlier, for reasons described in the above subchapters. But the debates also differed in what parts 
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of the Constitution were deemed as most relevant to evaluate the constitutionality of the bills. In 
the previous decades, proponents of federal legislation guaranteeing voting rights for servicemen 
based themselves on the Election Clause in Article One, Section Four of the Constitution, which 
stipulates that Congress has the power to “make or alter” election regulations.  Opponents based 
themselves on Article One, Section Two of the Constitution which stipulates that states have the 
power to set voter qualifications. By the 1970‟s, the Supreme Court had began using various parts 
of the Constitution, notably the Fourteenth Amendment, to justify federal involvement in the field 
of voting. The overseas voting rights discussions reflected this. Proponents of the voting rights 
bills for overseas Americans viewed section 202 of the 1970 amendments to the Voting Rights 
Act and the Supreme Court ruling in Oregon v. Mitchell as relevant to their bills.
 281
 In Oregon, 
the Court had in essence upheld a federal act modifying how states could define bona fide 
residency. Oregon upheld section 202 of the (amendments to the) Voting Rights Act which 
required a state to include as voters a specific group of citizens who were no longer residents of 
that state, namely citizens who established residence in a new state less than thirty days before a 
presidential election. Proponents of overseas Americans voting rights therefore believed that a 
federal law modifying the definition of bona fide residency to include another group, overseas 
Americans who were disenfranchised by strict residency rules, would be upheld by the court. 
While Oregon had only dealt with presidential election, the court had stated that similar 
legislation covering congressional elections would probably be upheld as well. Proponents of 
voting rights for overseas citizens therefore based themselves on the same constitutional 
arguments that had been used to support section 202 of the 1970 amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act, and on the arguments of the 8 to 1 Supreme Court decision in Oregon v. Mitchell 
upholding section 202. In fact, the congressional findings that had been inserted in the text of 
section 202 to justify the act were, with minor changes, inserted into the bills covering overseas 
citizens. The findings stated that state laws excluding overseas Americans from voting: 
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deny or abridge the inherent constitutional right of citizens to vote in Federal election; 
deny or abridge the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement to and 
from the Unites States; 
deny or abridge the privileges and immunities guaranteed under the Constitution to citizens of the 
United States and to citizens of each State; 
in some instances have the impermissible purpose or effect of denying citizens the right to vote in 
Federal elections because of the method in which they may vote; 
have the effect of denying to citizens the equality of civil rights and due process and equal 
protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment to the 
Constitution; and 
do not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct of Federal 
elections.
 283
 
In sum, and as the House majority report accompanying the bill that was finally passed explained, 
proponents argued that the right to vote for national officers was an inherent constitutional right 
and privilege of national citizenship, a right also implied in the right to freedom of travel, (all 
proscribed in the Fourteenth Amendment,) and that Congress had the power to protect these right 
and privilege under both the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article One, Section Eight, and the 
enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment.
284
 These were the same arguments that had 
been used by the court to uphold section 202 in Oregon. (The justices had, however, rendered 
different opinions, each opinion using different combinations of the above constitutional 
provisions.) Furthermore, though not emphasized in the majority Senate or House report 
accompanying the bill that became law, the equal protection of laws (also proscribed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment) was also at issue when it came to securing voting rights for overseas 
Americans, according to some proponents.
285
 
 The overseas Americans‟ voting rights bills dealt with in the 1973 and 1975 congressional 
hearings opened with a statement announcing that the purpose of the act was to guarantee the 
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constitutional right to vote to this group.
286
 The Supreme Court had several times announced that 
“among the rights and privileges of National citizenship recognized by this court are…the right to 
vote for National officers,” and that this right was “preservative of other basic civil and political 
rights.”287 However, the Supreme Court had also noted that the equal right to vote was not 
absolute, and that states had the power to impose voter qualifications and to regulate the access to 
the franchise in other ways.
288
 However, such restrictions needed to be strictly scrutinized and 
needed to show they were necessary to preserve a compelling state interest. Proponents pointed to 
the Supreme Court ruling in Dunn v. Blumstein (1972).
289
 The decision in Dunn v. Blumstein had 
argued that a state could set an appropriately defined and uniformly applied bona fide residency 
requirement for voting, but the court struck down Tennessee‟s lengthy residency requirements 
because there was no evidence that such a requirement served a compelling state interest. 
According to proponents of overseas Americans‟ voting rights, there was no compelling state 
interest in excluding overseas Americans from bona fide residence (for voting purposes) either. 
Proponents argued that overseas Americans had ample opportunities to keep informed and 
familiarized with U.S. politics, the bills in question would only allow them to vote in presidential 
and congressional elections (and not state or local elections,)
290
 and even if overseas Americans 
had different policy interests than citizens living in the U.S., excluding voters because of their 
political opinions was would violate the Constitution. Senator Goldwater argued that even if the 
constitutional right to vote was not absolute, and even if Congress did not have a general mandate 
to set voter qualifications, the overseas citizens‟ voting rights bills aimed at correcting a specific 
problem faced by a specific group of citizens (as Congress had done in section 202 of the Voting 
Rights Act). Such legislation was therefore within Congress‟ powers to protect and facilitate the 
personal right and privilege of voting which the Supreme Court had found to be granted to 
citizens under the Constitution.
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 Freedom to travel had long been viewed as part of a person‟s “liberty” (protected from 
infringement by the federal government in the Fifth Amendment and from the states in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.) In cases like Aptheker v. Secretary of State (1964), the Supreme Court 
had specified that that liberty included the freedom to travel abroad, and under cases like 
Crandall v. Nevada (1968), this liberty did not restrict itself to those who were always on the 
move, but included freedom to settle abroad.
293
  States punishing citizens for settling abroad by 
disenfranchising them was thus, according to proponents, an infringement on the right to travel. 
Marans of the Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting and Nathan Lewin, former assistant 
solicitor general and former deputy assistant attorney general, (who both assisted proponents in 
Congress) held in fact that the strongest constitutional argument backing federal bills 
guaranteeing the voting rights of overseas citizens was that such rights were linked to the 
constitutional right to the international travel and settlement.
294
 
It was also argued that disenfranchising overseas Americans also discarded the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, for all states allowed by now military personnel 
and federal employees to vote and register absentee (at least formally.) Discriminating on the 
basis of occupation did not seem constitutional.
295
 Furthermore, the fact that states had 
functioning procedures for federal employees and servicemen (and their dependents) proved that 
overseas voting was doable, and judging by the attempts at counting these groups, private citizens 
abroad were outnumbered by servicemen, federal government employees, and their dependents. 
This fact should appease opposition to enfranchising overseas Americans out of concerns of 
fraud, since fears of fraud did not stop states from enfranchising those other groups. Furthermore, 
moving abroad to work at an American firm‟s overseas branch for instance, was no more 
voluntary than joining the army or getting a job as a diplomat, and could therefore not be used as 
an argument for justifying a distinction between private citizens and servicemen, federal 
employees, and their dependents.
296
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  Opponents believed that Congress could not, consistent with the Constitution, extend the 
right to vote to all Americans residing abroad. A minority view was included in the House report 
accompanying the bill that became law, written by four Republicans.
297
 It did not focus on the 
argument used by opponents in the 1940‟s and 1950‟s maintaining that providing for absentee 
registration and balloting procedures involved the setting of voting qualifications (which was a 
state prerogative.) The minority report recognized that the Supreme Court had in several 
decisions upheld  both Congress‟ power to regulate the times, places and manner of holding 
federal elections, and congressional powers to fix voter qualifications in federal elections if 
appropriate to enforce rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The report even recognized that at 
least one case, Oregon v. Mitchell, suggested that Congress could fix voter qualifications even 
without any justification of protecting other constitutional rights (argued in the separate opinion 
of Justice Black.) However, these congressional powers to make or alter voter qualification in 
federal elections, the minority view contended, had one limit. The limit was based on the fact, 
according to the minority view, that the Constitution itself set one minimum voter qualification: 
the voter had to be a resident of a state. The minority report pointed to Article One, Section Two 
of the Constitution: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every 
second year by the people of the several States and the electors in each state shall have the 
qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature” 
(emphasis added.) The minority report pointed to the Seventeenth Amendment: “The Senate of 
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people 
thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have 
the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures” 
(emphasis added.) In other words, the minority report pointed to same parts of the Constitution as 
opponents had in the 1940‟s and 1950‟s, but instead of arguing that these provisions gave the 
states the power to determine if overseas Americans qualified as voters, they maintained that the 
Constitution itself set the that qualification. For a person residing overseas who could not prove 
an intent to return could not qualify as “the people” of a state, according to the minority view. 
While there was no such constitutionally proscribed qualification as concerned presidential 
elections, a constitutional amendment had been needed to allow D.C. residents to vote in 
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presidential elections, it maintained.
298
 Opponents argued that the voting rights bills for overseas 
Americans in effect abolished bona fide residence in a state as a qualification of voting.
299
 
Proponents countered this by arguing that the bills merely moderated the definition of bona fide 
residency and did not eradicate it. Persons who had moved abroad could be included as residents 
for voting purposes in the state they last resided in, as long as they did not established residency 
in any other state, proponents argued. Opponents answered the latter argument by stating that it 
was not possible to create such an unnatural new type of state citizenship. You were either a state 
citizens or you were not. Opponents furthermore argued that Oregon v. Mitchell had no relevance 
to the voting rights of overseas Americans, insisting that Oregon only dealt with durational 
residency and remedies for it, not the question of congressional powers to define bona fide 
residency per se.
300
   
Congressional opponents were in the 1973 Senate hearings supported by the 
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress in their conclusion that the relevant 
bills were unconstitutional.
301
 The Congressional Research Service had been asked to provide the 
Senate Rules and Administration Committee with information concerning federal legislation 
which would enfranchise overseas Americans. While including both sources supporting and 
opposing the constitutionality of federal legislation, legislative attorney Jack H. Maskell of the 
Congressional Research Service concluded that the federal government had no constitutional 
power to enact such legislation, emphasizing that the states had a compelling interest in excluding 
overseas Americans due to their “lack of familiarity with, and lack of direct interest in, the affairs 
of a state from which such person may have abandoned physical residence for numerous 
years.”302 It is perhaps a bit curious that the research service which is supposed to be neutral 
should reach that conclusion, when in the end, a great majority of Congress did accepted a federal 
bill and as no Supreme Court ever agreed with the research service‟s position.      
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As already mentioned, the Justice Department also supported the congressional 
opponents‟ view. Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the Office of Legal Council Mary C. 
Lawton prepared statements for both the 1973 and the 1975 hearings, in which she explained in 
detail why the department believed the bills were unconstitutional. Her arguments were very 
similar to those presented in the minority House report. One additional point she made was to 
counter the overseas citizens‟ gimmick “no taxation without representation.” Lawton argued that 
not all overseas Americans actually paid taxes to the U.S.
303
 This point was countered by 
proponents who argued that requiring taxes for the right to cast ballots had long been banned (for 
instance by the Twenty-fourth Amendment (1964) to the Constitution, abolishing poll taxes,) and 
that no one was disenfranchising housewives, students, or the unemployed physically residing in 
the U.S.
304
 Representative Hays (R-OH) also pointed out that in 1974, 150 million dollars had 
been retrieved in federal taxes from overseas private citizens.
305
   
One difference between the Justice Department‟s written statement in the 1973 Senate 
hearings and the minority report was concerned the issue of whether or not enfranchising 
overseas Americans was good policy (versus in keeping with the Constitution.) Lawton wrote in 
1973 that “it seems basically unfair” to enfranchise overseas Americans because they had no 
interest or knowledge of the states in which they formerly lived, and that the bills presented 
“serious policy questions.”306 She did not develop further on the issue. In contrast, the minority 
report stated that as a policy matter, federal legislation enfranchising all Americans overseas 
might be wise, but that good policy had to yield to constitutional concerns. On the House floor, 
Wiggins repeated this view: “Mr. Chairman, this bill requires that we rise above our natural 
instincts to be supportive of the right of U.S. citizens residing abroad to vote. It requires that we 
place on a higher order our loyalty to the Constitution of the Unites States. Unfortunately these 
citizens are not constitutionally eligible to vote in a state in which they are not residents.”307 
Whether opponents in Congress agreed with the Justice Department that it was unfair to 
enfranchise citizens abroad or whether, as they officially stated, they only opposed it on 
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constitutional grounds, is up for speculation. An attempt at guarding themselves against critique 
from overseas voters if (and when) they would be enfranchised might have influenced quotes like 
the one above. In any case, Lawton left out the argument that enfranchising overseas Americans 
was a bad policy decision when she again testified in the 1975 hearings.
308
  
Proponents finally argued that there was no need to be concerned with the constitutional 
question because the Supreme Court could take care of it. If one had been equally afraid of 
passing “groundbreaking” legislation, there would not have been any Civil Rights Act in 1964, 
no Voting Rights Act in 1965.
309
  
3.6 The Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act 
On December 10, 1975, the House passed bill S. 95 by a 374 to 43 vote, and the Senate concurred 
on December 18. Interestingly, of those who had voted negatively in the House, 28 were 
Republicans, 14 were Southern Democrats, and only one was a Northern Democrat.
310
 In other 
words, in contrast to the 1940‟s and 1950‟s, sponsorship of absentee voting for overseas 
Americans was clearly bipartisan, but the old coalition of opponents persisted. The House had in 
the end deleted the findings that gave the constitutional base of the bill for being 
“unnecessary”.311 Adequate justification of the bill could be found in hearings and congressional 
reports, according to the House. Deleting these findings might have made the bill easer to 
swallow for many members of Congress, as it removed disagreement on exactly what parts of the 
constitution authorized such congressional legislation. After all, even the 8 to 1 Supreme Court 
decision in Oregon v. Mitchell provided several separate opinions relying on different parts of the 
Constitution. The findings seem to have concluded not only that Congress had authority to 
enfranchise overseas Americans for instance under the power to regulate elections as they had in 
the 1940‟s and 1950‟s, but they also seemed to imply that overseas Americans‟ right to vote was 
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derived directly from the Constitution, which was probably extra difficult to swallow.
312
 The 
Senate agreed to the deletion of the findings, as the sponsors of S. 95 regarded the change as 
mainly a technical one.
313
  
 As both houses of Congress had passed S. 95, a new threat lingered. In fact, Marans (the 
attorney working for the Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting) says that the biggest 
opposition and the biggest threat to the passing of federal legislation enfranchising overseas 
Americans came from one person in particular: Antony Scalia of the Justice Department.
314
 
Scalia, at the time S. 95 was passed an Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 
Counsel (and later Supreme Court Justice,) continued to oppose the bill. He persuaded the 
attorney general to oppose the president‟s signature. Marans asked Senator Goldwater to go over 
the head of the Justice Department and call President Fords legal council. Goldwater is to have 
said: “Listen, you damned fools, there are more Republicans in Paris than there are in Detroit, 
and Ford doesn‟t want to be the first president to veto a voting rights bill since the 
Reconstruction.”315 The bill was signed by Ford on January 2, 1976, and became the Overseas 
Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975.
316
 It guaranteed all Americans living overseas the right to 
register and vote absentee in all federal elections in the state in which they last resided, even 
though they did not “have a place of abode or other address in such State or district, and his intent 
to return to such State may be uncertain,” if they complied with all other applicable State or 
district qualifications and requirements consistent with the act.
317
 The act contained few 
requirements concerning the manner in which the actual registration and balloting procedures 
should be executed by the states.    
 One other important provision in S. 95 that the House had deleted, would have made it 
illegal for states to tax overseas citizens solely on the basis of being registered to vote in that 
state. Overseas Americans faced the possibility of being taxed both by the U.S. government and 
by the country of residence (despite bilateral tax treaties,) but also by some states taxed overseas 
Americans even if such citizens were not otherwise connected to the state. Several members of 
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Congress believed that the risk of being taxed by the states discouraged overseas Americans from 
attempting to register to vote.
318
 Senator Pell had in 1975 argued that such state taxation could be 
viewed as a poll tax which had been banned by the Twenty-fourth Amendment, and that 
requiring an overseas citizen to pay taxes when that citizens enjoyed none of the rights or 
privileges associated to being domiciled in a state, presented a possible violation of the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
319
 In 1978, Congress revisited the 
issue. According to one U.S. Chamber of Commerce survey of overseas citizens, 50 percent of 
those who had not voted in the 1976 elections had named fear of state taxation as the main reason 
for it.
320
 In addition to the tax issue, the survey report also noted that half the states had not 
enfranchised their overseas citizens despite the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act, and that 
inconsistencies in states‟ voting laws still remained.  On November 4, 1978, President Carter 
signed S. 703 into law.
321
 First of all, it amended the existing law by stating that overseas citizens 
were not liable to state taxation solely on the basis registering and voting absentee in federal 
election. Secondly, S. 703 included many of the recommendations for absentee voting procedures 
that were found in the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955, and required the presidential 
designee to design a federal post card that would serve as an application both for registration and 
for an absentee ballot. Thirdly, it amended Federal Voting Assistance Act by requiring, in stead 
of merely recommending, the states to enfranchise the groups covered by the act. For the 
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act had unintentionally left out one group, namely the members 
of the armed forces while in active duty, members of the Merchant Marine, and their spouses and 
dependents, who were away from their voting districts though not outside U.S. territory. The 
House report accompanying S. 704, did not discuss the constitutionality of the bill in the majority 
statement, but it contained a minority statement maintaining that the bill was unconstitutional, 
again authored by Wiggins.
322
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3.7 Conclusion 
The “voting rights revolution” between the late 1950‟s and early 1970‟s removed many of the 
obstacles to passing federal legislation that would guarantee absentee voting rights of private 
citizens residing abroad that had restricted similar legislation covering military voters in the 
1940‟s and 1950‟s.323 Nonetheless, disagreements over constitutionally proscribed federal and 
state powers still influenced policy debates concerning voting rights legislation (aimed at 
overseas citizens.) Several members in Congress, backed by the Justice Department, opposed a 
federal guarantee of absentee voting rights for private citizens, officially focusing on the 
argument that the most essential qualification to voting (in a state) was state residency. This was 
a qualification proscribed by the Constitution, and it was up to the states to determine the exact 
definition of “residency,” they argued. Proponents, however, inspired by the successful 
argumentation in favor of other voting rights bills, maintained that voting rights had by now been 
recognized as a vital aspect of citizenship. Restrictions to the franchise therefore had to be 
justified by proof of a compelling state interest, as the Supreme Court had argued in several 
rulings. States had no compelling interest in excluding overseas citizens from a definition of 
residency for voting purposes, proponents argued. Overseas citizens would only be guaranteed 
the right to vote in congressional and presidential elections, and Congress and the president dealt 
with issues of national concern, issues that also affected overseas citizens. 
 It seems that interest groups of overseas citizens had a significant influence on policy 
debates, raising awareness of their voting problems, convincing Congress that they were 
interested in and well informed of U.S. politics, and that they were good, taxpaying Americans 
who deserved representation in Congress. Efforts by both Congress and interest groups were 
bipartisan. Meanwhile, judging by the House vote on the bill that became the Overseas Citizens 
Voting Rights Act of 1975, the opposition was made up of Republicans and Southern Democrats 
(much like the opposition to voting rights bills in general.)
324
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-4- 
Recent Developments 
In the 1970‟s, Congress had passed legislation that guaranteed the absentee voting rights of 
servicemen, their spouses and dependents, and overseas citizens. In 1986, existing legislation was 
replaced by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act (UOCAVA). This act still 
provides the framework for overseas and military voting today. However, UOCAVA has been 
substantially amended since the 1980‟s, for theoretical voting rights and voting in practice are 
two different things. The states are still in charge of arranging elections, and states have had 
different success rates in making the voting process easy or even possible. The patchwork of 
different state regulations has furthermore caused confusion for voters abroad, as has lack of 
adequate information (especially during the days before the internet.) 
This chapter deals with the relevant policy discussion during the period from the 1980‟s 
to the present. These discussions evolved around making state laws covering servicemen, their 
spouses and dependents, and overseas citizens, more uniform and effective. Judging by available 
material, it does not seem like there have been any noteworthy discussions regarding the 
constitutionality of a federal guarantee of the absentee voting rights of these groups since the 
1970‟s, nor any noteworthy discussions regarding the policy merits of enfranchising these groups 
(though there have been such discussions about other issues that affect overseas citizens, 
including discussions regarding taxation and Medicare.)
325
 Nevertheless, the presence of states‟ 
rights concerns has continued to temper federal efforts to improve state laws. Another important 
factor that influenced federal policy towards enfranchising these groups was the 2000 presidential 
election scandal. It put election reform in general on the national agenda, and it also specifically 
highlighted problems with state laws regulating voting by groups covered by UOCAVA. 
Importantly, the fact that many Republicans believe that the majority of the UOCAVA 
population vote for their party may have diminished the Republican opposition that has made 
other voting reforms aimed at easing access to the polls difficult. Another factor that has pushed 
Congress to move forward has been the continued efforts by military and overseas American 
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advocacy groups. Furthermore, easing the passage of new legislation has been the fact that one of 
the UOCAVA groups in particular, members of the uniformed services, is a popular and 
uncontroversial group to support. In the long run, overseas civilian voters probably benefit from 
being linked to the military voters, though the focus on the latter voters has also been problematic 
for them. These are issues that will be discussed below. 
4.1 The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act (UOCAVA)  
The federal law that currently (fall 2011) provides for absentee voting by servicemen, their 
spouses and dependents, and overseas voters, was signed by President Ronald Reagan on August 
28, 1986.
326
 It had been passed by the House and the Senate by voice vote a few weeks earlier, 
and guaranteed the voting rights of the covered groups in general, special, primary, and run-off 
elections for federal office.
327
 The report accompanying H.R. 4393 that became the Uniformed 
and Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act stated that its primary purpose was to consolidate and 
update provisions of current federal law, and provide for a federal write-in absentee ballot.
328
 It 
thus repealed the existing law, which by now included the Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 
and the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975. The federal write-in absentee ballot had 
not been used since the 1944 elections, when the Soldier Voting Act had been amended to 
include such a provision (as discussed in chapter two.) The provision had been repealed in the 
1946 amendment to the Soldier Voting Act because few servicemen had taken advantage of it, 
and because many of the states in which there was a real need for the emergency write-in ballot 
did not accept its use (since the provision merely recommended that states accept it.) The 
sponsors of UOCAVA had hoped that the write-in ballot would help solve the single largest 
reason for continued disenfranchisement of the covered groups: state failure to provide adequate 
ballot transit time. The write-in ballot would be used only by voters who had followed the state 
deadlines for absentee registration and ballot application, but had not received a regular ballot in 
time to return it to the state before election day. As suggested by its name, the write-in ballot was 
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a blank ballot in which the voter could fill in the names of candidates or party of his or her 
choice, and it would be made available on “military bases and ships, at American embassies and 
consulates, and at other locations overseas.”329 Unlike the 1944 amendment to the Soldier Voting 
Act, UOCAVA required states to accept this emergency ballot. 
Except for reintroducing the write-in ballot, UOCAVA made few changes to the laws it 
replaced. UOCAVA contained few state procedural requirements, but included a list of 
recommendations such as state acceptance of the federal post card application for simultaneous 
registration and ballot request, and the sending of ballots to voters at “the earliest opportunity.” 
The Federal Voting Assistance Program that had been established by the 1955 Federal Voting 
Assistance Act was continued through a provision requiring a presidential designee to carry out 
the acts‟ federal responsibilities such as prescribing a federal post card application and a federal 
write-in absentee ballot, and compiling and distributing information on state absentee registration 
and balloting procedures including, to the extent possible, facts relating to specific elections, 
including dates and offices involved. Like Eisenhower, Reagan chose the Secretary of Defense 
who continues to be responsible for the Federal Voting Assistance Program today (fall 2011.)
330
  
Finally, UOCAVA authorizes the Attorney General to bring civil action in appropriate district 
courts to enforce the act (as had the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act.)
331
  
4.2 UOCAVA Voting and the 2000 Presidential Election Scandal 
While problems with state laws or execution of laws continued to disenfranchise many 
UOCAVA voters, it seems that little congressional attention was given to the issue for a decade 
and a half.
332
 However, the 2000 presidential election brought the issue of voting rights to 
                                                 
329
 See report to accompany H.R. 4393: 5. 
330
 Executive order No. 12,642 53 Fed. Reg. 21,975 (June 8, 1988), referenced in Hans A. von Sparkovsky, “Voting 
by Military Personnel and Overseas Citizens: the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Rights Act,” 
The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy. 
331
 For this information on the act and the comparison with previous acts, see U.S. Congress, Committee on House 
Administration, Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting, report to accompany H.R. 4393, 99
th
 Congress, 
Second Session, H.Rept. 99-765 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986) 5; Uniformed and Overseas 
Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), P.L. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924-929 (August 28, 1986) ; the Overseas 
Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975, P.L. 94-203, 89 Stat. 1142-1144 (Jan. 2, 1976); and the Federal Voting 
Assistance Act, P.L. 84-296, 69 Stat. 584-589 (Aug. 9, 1955).   
332
 See Kevin J. Coleman, The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Voting Act: Overview and Issues (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 17, 2011) http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20764_20110217.pdf 
accessed November 5, 2011. 
84 
 
national attention in a way it had not been since the 1960‟s,333 and it also specifically shed light 
on UOCAVA voting. Usually the winner of a presidential election is named on election night 
when new networks project winners based on early returns and exit polls. In 2000, however, 
election “night” lasted for over a month. The morning after election day, it became clear that Al 
Gore was so far (in the counting and recounting process) leading in the popular vote by a mere 
200,000 votes nationally over George W. Bush. Gore had won, or was ahead, in states that would 
give him 267 electoral votes, while Bush had 246. To win the election, 270 electoral votes were 
needed, and the focus turned to the state that would determine the election by giving either 
candidate its 25 electoral votes: Florida. For in Florida, the election was so close that no winner 
had yet been named. Bush was leading by less than 2000 votes in a state where six million votes 
had been cast. After an automatic recount a few days later, mandated by Florida law in close 
elections, Bush‟ lead was narrowed to a few hundred votes. This qualified as a statistical tie: the 
margin of victory was smaller than the margin of error of the vote-counting apparatus. But 
somehow, the state had to find a winner, and decisions had to be made concerning whether or 
not, where, and how recounts by hand should be done. These decisions became the topic of legal 
and partisan conflict between the two major parties and the campaign organizations. The conflict 
ran its course in state and federal courts, as well as in the media. Light was shed on many 
problems in Floridian election procedures and laws. Confusing and ineffective voting machinery 
was in the spot light, as was a poorly designed “butterfly ballot” that had made many voters in 
Palm Beach county to mistakenly mark their ballot for conservative Patrick Buchanan instead of 
Al Gore, and groups of Floridian citizens protested that they had been deprived of their voting 
rights due to inaccurate registration records, flawed lists of convicted felons, racial discrimination 
and biased Republican election officials.
334
      
 Among the many problems causing the month long election debacle, was late arriving 
UOVAVA votes that could be crucial to the election outcome. Florida had received 2,411 
overseas ballots after the election deadline on November 7. If they were counted, Bush would 
lead the election in Florida by 537 votes, and if they were rejected, Gore would lead by 202 
votes. The question was which standard for counting votes should be used: the Floridian statutory 
law requiring ballots received after a 7 p.m. election day deadline to be rejected, or the 
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administrative rule that gave an extended deadline for overseas votes. In 1980, the U.S. had sued 
the State of Florida for violating the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 by sending out 
overseas ballots too late for them to be returned in time for counting (and thus in practice 
disenfranchising overseas citizens.) The judge in the case provided injunctive relief by ordering 
ballots received within ten days of election day to be counted. As Florida later failed to take 
measures for sorting out the situation for overseas voters for future elections that would satisfy 
the court, a consent decree between the U.S. and Florida requiring the ten day extension as well 
as requiring ballot to be mailed 35 days before an election became permanent and delineated as 
Florida Administrative Code § 1S-2.013. The administrative rule directly contradicting a state 
statue would regulate elections as concerned overseas voters for the next 16 years with little 
attention given to the situation. In 2000, however, when overseas votes suddenly could sway the 
entire U.S. election, the issue was brought to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Florida.
335
 It ruled that because the administrative rule was mandated by a federal court as part of 
the enforcement of a federal act, the administrative rule superseded the state‟s statute. The late 
arriving overseas votes were counted.  
The Florida Supreme Court had ordered a recount of votes in the state. The Supreme 
Court overruled this decision, however. On December 12, the election debacle was ended by 
Bush v. Gore, in which the 5-4 Supreme Court ruling halted the Florida recount because it argued 
that the method of the recount violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and that no other recount method could be established by the time limit set by the 
state of Florida. The ruling ultimately gave Florida and thus the election to Bush.
336
 More lenient 
laws enfranchising ex-felons, correct registration lists, understandable and well functioning voter 
technology, impartiality in the handling of the voting process, and potentially, allowing a recount, 
were factors that probably would have made more of a difference to the election outcome than 
the UOCAVA votes (since for instance ex-felons are often presumed to be more likely to vote 
Democratic, see next subchapter). However, given the situation, it seems that the 2,411 
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UOCAVA votes arriving after election day ended up determining the winner of the Presidency. 
Bush had won Florida by 537 votes over Gore.
337
  
4.3 Reactions to the 2000 Election Scandal 
The General Climate of Election Reform 
While the problems with Florida‟s election laws and regulations might have had particularly 
significant consequences for the entire 2000 presidential election, such problems were not unique 
to that state. 
338
 The scandal ridden election brought forth a wave of interest in reforming 
numerous aspects of U.S. elections. Teams of experts founded by universities and foundations 
attempted to evaluate new technology and look for ways to improve voting, as did a Carter-Ford 
commission, and numerous old and new advocacy groups. Local, state and federal officials, both 
elected and appointed, urged the passage of new legislation to avoid another “Florida-2000” 
situation. However, despite all this attention given to the need for improvement, the political 
climate was not entirely receptive to election reform. While new legislation was eventually 
passed both at the federal and state level, Keyssar maintains that federal efforts such as the Help 
American Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002 had limited results.  
Among the factors that made election reform difficult, was the fact that Congress had 
become more strongly split along partisan lines since the fight over the Presidency in 2000, and 
the partisan passions continued throughout Bush‟s two terms and continues still. Election reform 
often became an issue that pitted Democrats who wanted to maximize access to the polls against 
Republicans who were reluctant to such efforts for fear of fraud. The Democratic party would 
often gain the most from efforts to enroll new voters and make access to the polls easier (by for 
instance not requiring photo ID‟s at the polling stations,) because such efforts were aimed at the 
poor and at minority voters, who tended to vote Democratic. Democrats often claimed that 
Republicans were trying to suppress the votes of these groups for partisan reasons, pointing for 
instance to the purging of registration lists in Florida in 2000 as an example of such behavior. 
Republicans on the other hand claimed they were only trying to keep elections free from fraud, 
                                                 
337
 For more information on the role of late arriving UOCAVA votes in the 2000 Florida election, see for instance 
David Barstow and Don Van Natta Jr. “How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote,” The New 
York Times July 15, 2001; Kosuke Imai and Gary King, “Did Illegally Counted Overseas Absentee Ballots Decide 
the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election?” Perspectives on Politics, vol. 2, nr.3, September 2004: 537-549.  
338
For this paragraph, see Keyssar 2009: 262-94, unless otherwise stated. 
87 
 
and some reversed the accusations and claimed that it was the Democrats‟ initiatives that had 
partisan motives. Through the years that passed, many Republicans, including Karl Rove 
(President Bush‟ top political advisor), believed that election fraud was indeed a major problem, 
caused largely by Democratic efforts at enrolling new voters, despite the fact that no evidence has 
yet been materialized proving “any large-scale, organized efforts to affect the outcome of either 
federal or state elections through fraudulent voting,” according to Keyssar.339 In any case, close 
elections exacerbated tensions between the two parties when it came to election reform. Reforms 
passed after the 2000 debacle were compromises between the fear of fraud and increasing access 
to the polls, and between fears of loosing or gaining votes.  
Concerns about states‟ rights were also an obstacle to federal reform initiatives. In 
February 2001, a task force of the National Association of Secretaries of States met in 
Washington to discuss election reform in states.
340
 It maintained that election administration was 
a state and not a federal matter, and that what the states needed was federal funds, not federal 
interference. In Congress, Democrats tended to support mandatory national standards, while 
Republicans tended to prefer voluntary compliance with national standards. The issue of 
disenfranchisement of felons or ex-felons had been raised in the Florida scandal. Florida was one 
of less than a dozen states that imposed lifetime disenfranchisement for persons convicted of a 
felony, and according to some estimates, 30 percent of Floridian African American males were 
kept away from the polls because of it. Both major political parties assumed that such voters 
would disproportionately vote Democratic, and the issue thus became a partisan one. But in 
Congress, it also met states‟ rights concerns. A 2002 proposal for the mandatory restoration of 
voting rights for ex-felons was overwhelmingly defeated in the Senate. A similar measure 
sponsored by among others Hilary Clinton three years later failed as well, as did later attempts.  
In 2002 Congress passed Help American Vote Act (HAVA). HAVA contained a list of 
federal requirements to the states, including requirements concerning voting machines, and a 
requirement that states assemble computerized statewide registration lists. It also provided funds 
for the states to comply with these requirements. The Election Assistance Commission was also 
established by the act, which was to serve as a clearinghouse of information about voting systems 
and to distribute a total of $ 3 billion in grants to the states. Keyssar argues that HAVA was “a 
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limited, even pale, achievement,” and that election administration remained decentralized. For 
while HAVA did signal increased federal involvement in the conduct of American elections, it 
left room for considerable interpretation of its provisions to the states, and did not address a great 
number of important issues such as administrative control of state elections by partisan officials, 
the disenfranchisement of ex-felons, problems with the Electoral College or the lack of a clear 
constitutional right to vote.
341
  
In the 1970‟s, many of the advocates of overseas voting rights had argued that they had a 
constitutional right to vote.
342
 However, the 2000 election was a reminder that there is no clear 
language in the constitution guaranteeing the individual right to vote. The Bush v. Gore ruling 
contained a few little noticed sentences stating just that. In 2001, Representative Jesse Jackson, 
Jr. (D-Ill) introduced in the House the text of a proposed constitutional amendment that would 
give every adult citizens an affirmative right to vote. He argued that every vote would have had 
to be counted in the 2000 election if there had been a clear constitutional right to vote. He 
believed such an amendment would overcome continued discrimination capsuled in states‟ rights, 
and would ensure that each vote counted the same. Jackson reintroduced his amendment in the 
consecutive years, and it gradually gained support. By 2003 he had forty-five co-sponsors, and by 
2005 he had fifty-five. The amendment gained attention from outside Congress as well. In 2003 it 
was in focus in a national conference that included representatives of nearly all voting rights 
organizations in the nation. While the American-sponsored Iraqi constitution of 2005 contained a 
right to vote, as did the majority of the constitutions of democratic nations, the U.S. was not 
ready to incorporate such a right into theirs. No Republican members of Congress agreed to co-
sponsor Jackson‟s amendment, and Republicans were simply silent on the issue. Some 
Democrats thought such an amendment was unnecessary as they believed it was already implicit 
in the Constitution, some believed it would jeopardize the renewal of the Voting Rights Act, and 
some wanted to keep away from constitutional amendments all together because they feared 
Republican initiatives on issues such as gay marriage. No companion bill was ever introduced in 
the Senate, and the House as a whole never debated or voted on Jackson‟s amendment. 343 
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Furthermore, the 2000 election was a reminder that every vote did not count equally: 
because of the system of the Electoral College, George Bush would become the first president 
since the late nineteenth century to be elected who had not also gained the majority of the popular 
vote. Gore had got half a million more popular votes. But the Electoral Collage also remained 
untouched.  
 
Reform Specific to UOCAVA 
The accurate number of UOCAVA citizens is not known, but as UOCAVA was passed in 1986, 
Congress estimated that there were around 6 million Active Duty members, military dependents, 
and overseas civilians. A report released in 2011 by the Federal Voting Assistance Program still 
used the same estimate of 6 million, of which 1.51 million were military, 1 million military 
dependents.
344
 For a decade and a half after 1986, Congress had paid little attention to the voting 
rights of these citizens. But the 2000 election seems to have made UOCAVA voters more 
interesting group, a group that could potentially determine the outcome of close elections. The 
election also revealed problems with UOCAVA voting processes. In Florida-2000, discussions 
concerning UOCAVA votes had not only concerned ballots arriving late, it had concerned a 
number of details like whether to count overseas ballots that did not contain postmarks, 
signatures or other statutory required characteristics.
345
 It was clear that Floridian laws and 
regulations concerning UOCAVA voting, as well as those in other states, were confusing, 
inadequate, and risked disenfranchising overseas citizens. Around every federal election since 
2000, newspaper headlines have read, for instance “Both parties try to get out the vote of expat 
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citizens,” “Campaigns Look Overseas For Votes,” “Efforts increase to enfranchise U.S. citizens 
abroad,” and “Forget Iowa. How About That Antarctica Vote?”346  
During the years that followed the 2000 fiasco, UOCAVA was amended by HAVA and 
by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2002, by the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2005, and by the Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007.
347
 The amendments included a 
number of procedural requirements to states. HAVA, for instance, prohibited states from refusing 
to accept a valid voter registration application on the grounds that it was submitted to early, 
required states to designate a single office to inform UOCAVA voters on how to register and 
apply for ballots, and required the states to report the number of ballots sent to UOCAVA voters 
and the number returned and cast in the election (UOCAVA already required the Secretary of 
Defense to collect such data, but did not require states to provide such data.) The amendments 
that were achieved through HAVA also included new federal responsibilities. For instance, the 
Secretary of Defense was required to establish procedures to ensure a postmark or proof of 
mailing date on absentee ballots, and was required to ensure that state officials were aware of the 
requirements of relevant federal law, and one provision required that each person who enlists 
receive the national voter registration form.
348
  
Despite reforms, problems persisted. The Overseas Vote Foundation published in 2009 a 
post election report based on survey responses from about 24,000 UOCAVA voters and 1,000 
local election officials.
349
 The report found that one in four of respondents, twenty-two percent, 
did not receive the ballot they had requested. Eight percent of the total pool of respondents went 
on to use the federal emergency ballot, the federal write-in absentee ballot, when ballots did not 
arrive from the states. Fourteen percent of respondents gave up trying to vote when their state 
ballots did not arrive. Nearly one-quarter of experienced voters still had questions or problems 
when registering to vote. In 2009, the Pew Center on the States published a report that examined 
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state practices when it came to UOCAVA voting.
350
 As the title of the report indicated, a major 
problem for UOCAVA voters was that there was No Time to Vote. 25 states did not provide 
enough time for overseas military citizens to vote, or ran a high risk of not doing so. Finally, the 
Federal Voting Assistance Program‟s 2008 Post Election Survey Report concluded that “The 
State-by-State absentee voting system produces a set of rules that are overly complex and 
difficult to administer for Voting Assistance Officers,” and recommended that states standardize 
and simplify UOVACA voting processes.
351
     
 To a certain degree, reform discussion concerning UOCAVA voting followed the same 
pattern as post-2000 election reform discussions in general. Concerns about fraud and states‟ 
rights seemed to have been present in UOCAVA discussions as well, and probably slowed 
federal initiatives. Fear of fraud had already been one of the arguments against the passage of the 
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act in the 1970‟s, but had been countered with arguments that 
the threat of fraud had not prevented states from enfranchising members of the armed forces and 
overseas federal employees in the preceding years (see chapter three.) In the post-2000 
discussions, the fear of fraud argument was in particular raised against initiatives involving 
electronic voting. The Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) had, even before the 2000 
election, been studying ways to use new technology to enfranchise UOCAVA voters, and the 
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2002 had included provisions that continued an FVAP online 
voting pilot project. The project was called the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting 
Experiment, and was to be tested in the 2004 elections. However, it was later cancelled due to 
fears of cyber attacks.
352
 Even members of Congress who are committed to passing legislation 
aimed at improving UOCAVA voting have shown skepticism internet voting.
353
  
Similar to discussions concerning election reform in general, Democrats and Republicans 
disagreed on how far Congress should go to make UOCAVA procedures uniform across the 
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states.
354
 In 2002, even the executive director of Republicans Abroad argued against mandatory 
requirements: “We‟re a states-rights party,” “We believe in the right of each state to determine 
how they want to conduct their election.”355 As a number of bills were introduced in Congress in 
2007 that included several state requirements (that were later incorporated in the Defense 
Authorization Act for FY 2010 and passed, see below), the International Herald Tribune noted 
that several nonpartisan overseas American advocacy groups as well as Democrats Abroad were 
quick to endorse the proposals. Yet the new executive director of Republicans Abroad, on the 
other hand, had no comment.
356
 
 While post-2000 federal discussions concerning UOCAVA voting reform in have several 
ways resembled the federal discussions concerning election reform in general, there has been at 
least one important difference. As previously discussed, election reform proposals aimed at 
increasing voter participation will often benefit Democrats, and might therefore diminish 
Republican incentive to support such legislation. When it comes to increasing UOCAVA turnout 
on the other hand, Republicans do not have the same reason to worry. As already noted, though 
the number of military and civilian employees can be found, no one knows the number or 
composition of perhaps the largest of the UOCAVA populations: non-governmental civilians 
abroad. Nor does anyone know how UOCAVA citizens vote. While amendments to UOCAVA 
have required states to collect statistical data such as the number of UOCAVA ballots sent and 
returned, and required the FVAP to gather such data from all states, UOCAVA ballots are usually 
not recorded separately. One exception was the late arriving Floridian UOCAVA votes in the 
2000 presidential election. The majority of these proved to be Republican. However, these 2411 
ballots did not include the 14,415 ballots arriving before the election deadline, and can not be 
seen as representative for UOCAVA voting behavior in all the states.
357
  
This lack of knowledge has lead both Democrats and Republicans to claim they have a 
leading edge in the UOCAVA vote.
358
 The Guardian wrote in 2004 that Democrats were pointing 
to a Zogby study which concluded that Americans with passports tended to vote liberal, while 
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Republicans claimed they had an edge due to a conservative international business community 
and conservative Pentagon civilian and military employees. The Guardian article commented, 
however, that the Republicans‟ faith in overwhelming support from the military might be overly 
optimistic. According to the article, many observers said the “strong pro-Republican culture that 
emerged in the military in the wake of Vietnam has begun to splinter,” partly because of the 
controversial war in Iraq. While polls of high ranking officers had shown staunch support for 
Bush, such polls did not necessarily reflect the views of rank-and-file soldiers who were 
disproportionately non-white, working-class and increasingly female. In any case, whether 
Republicans would benefit from increased turnout among UOCAVA citizens or not, what matters 
is that Republicans might believe they would. It seems likely that this belief had a positive effect 
on UOCAVA reform discussions and the successful the passage of the Military and Overseas 
Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act in Congress in 2009, an act that the Congressional Research 
Service describes as a “major overhaul” of UOCAVA.359 Noteworthy, the act had bipartisan 
sponsorship: Senators Charles Schumer (D-NY), Robert Bennett (R-UT), John Cornyn (R-TX), 
and a diverse mix of 56 other cosponsors.
360
  
 The MOVE Act was part of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2010 signed 
by Obama on October 28, 2009, (it was first introduced as a separate bill in the Senate, but was 
never voted on separately.) There is little available information on Obama‟s role concerning the 
MOVE Act. However, according to The New York Times, Obama supported election reform 
when he was senator. Also, the Association of American Residents Overseas has on their website 
a page long campaign statement for the 2008 presidential election which outlines Obama‟s 
support for overseas citizens on a number of issues that are of concern to them, including support 
for vigorous efforts to ensure that all overseas Americans are able to vote. This campaign 
statement, however, is unsigned.
361
  
The MOVE Act requires that states establish procedures to permit military and overseas 
voters to request registration and ballot applications electronically (and by mail should the voter 
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prefer so.) It also requires that states send registration applications, ballot applications and blank 
ballots to these voters electronically (and by mail). What the act does not require, however, is that 
states accept executed ballots returned electronically, because of the possibility of fraud. While 
UOCAVA already recommended that the states mail absentee ballots to voters at the earliest 
opportunity, the MOVE Act specifically requires that ballots be sent no later than 45 days before 
an election if a request is received at least 45 days before the election. The MOVE Act lists a 
number of other requirements including prohibiting the states from refusing to count an otherwise 
valid ballot on the basis of notarization requirements (which had caused problems in the Florida 
debacle) or restrictions on paper or envelope type, including size and weight. It requires that the 
use of the emergency ballot, the federal write-in absentee ballot, be expanded to include special, 
primary, and runoff elections. In short, the MOVE Act aims to use electronic technology, 
mandatory deadlines, and the emergency ballot to reduce the transit time problem, and aims at 
removing certain confusing detailed procedural requirement.
362
    
 The MOVE Act was embraced by UOCAVA advocacy groups. The Pew Center on the 
States and the Brennan Center for Justice applauded the bipartisan act for getting around the 
disputes over voter rights versus voter fraud, and for setting an example for further legislation 
providing for the use of electronic voter registration for the general population.
363
 A National 
Journal article also praised the act: 
At a time when the rest of Washington can‟t seem to stop bickering, voting rights advocates have 
quietly scored a bipartisan victory to help military and overseas voters participate in 
elections…The law‟s enactment is an object lesson in how framing an issue along non-ideological 
lines can transcend partisan splits so lawmakers actually get something done. It also offers a 
template for how to fix the bigger, systemic problems that plague U.S. elections, most notably the 
nation‟s error-ridden, paper-based registration system.364  
 A report by the Overseas Vote Foundation showed that by August 2010, 24 states had 
enacted new laws to comply with the MOVE Act, and by the end of the year, that number had 
risen to 32. The report also included results of a survey based on 5,257 overseas and military 
respondents. Comparing the findings to those in its 2008 election survey, the Overseas Vote 
Foundation suggested that improvements in the UOCAVA voting experience were still mild in 
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the midterm elections. For instance, one in five respondents who had applied for a ballot stated 
they did not receive the ballot they had requested, compared to one in four in the 2008 survey. 
Reforms needed time to be fully implemented before the full potential impact of the MOVE Act 
could be assessed, the survey report concluded.
365
   
The federal government was not the only source of election reform aimed at UOCAVA 
voters. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, also known as the 
Uniform Law Commission, consists of commissioners appointed by the 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Its task is to draft and promote proposals for 
uniform laws aimed at solving problems common to all the states. Even before the MOVE Act 
was passed, the commission had begun working on the text of a bill proposal that would ensure 
the voting rights of military personnel and overseas Americans. The commission hoped the text 
could serve as the blueprint for bills to be passed by the several state legislatures. According to 
the Federation of American Women‟s Clubs Overseas, the commission listened to a wide range 
of stakeholders including the Federal Voting Assistance Program, the State Department, the 
political parties, state and local election officials, and a number of non-profit organizations such 
as the Pew Center on the States, Overseas Vote Foundation, and federation of women‟s clubs 
itself (see subchapter 4.5 for info on the latter organizations.)
366
 After more than two years of 
study and drafting, the commission adopted a proposal dubbed the Uniform Military and 
Overseas Voters Act (UMOVA) at its annual meeting in July 2010. UMOVA contains all 
requirements of the 2009 amended UOCAVA, but goes even further. For instance, it extends 
UOCAVA voting rights to a group of overseas voters not enfranchised by UOCAVA: American 
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citizens born abroad who have not yet established residence in any state.
367
 Under UMOVA, 
these citizens would be allowed to vote in the place where their parent or legal guardian is (or 
was) eligible to vote. UMOVA also extends absentee voting rights of the covered groups to state 
and local elections. The Uniform Law Commission website, updated October 15, 2011, reports 
that six states have passed an “UMOVA bill”, and in seven other state and the District of 
Columbia legislatures, “UMOVA bills” have been introduced and are under consideration.368        
4.4 Focus on the Military 
It seems that federal efforts to improve UOCAVA voting rights often focus on one of the 
UOCAVA groups, namely the military. This is not new. As discussed in the preceding chapters, 
servicemen were the first of the groups to get federal attention when it came to voting rights. 
UOCAVA reform, including the MOVE Act, is usually baked into defense authorization acts (the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 being one exception). The senate hearing that lead up to the 
MOVE Act was titled Hearing on Problems for Military and Overseas Voters: Why many Soldier 
and their Families Can’t Vote.369 Most notably, the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) 
has been accused of being inefficient and biased in favor of service voter. As previously 
discussed, the FVAP was established by the Federal Voting Assistance Act in 1955, and is 
continued through UOCAVA. As indicated in its mission statement, its tasks includes assisting 
members of the uniformed services and overseas voters to vote, assisting the states in complying 
with federal law and advising them of how to best comply with UOCAVA, advocating on behalf 
of UOCAVA voters, collecting statistics and identifying problems faced by UOCAVA voters, 
and proposing methods to overcome such problems.
370
 The FVAP has since 1955 been housed 
within the Pentagon, and has been the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. FVAP faced 
particular criticism during the 2004 elections for spending the bulk of its recourses on aiding 
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military voters, and for using a contractor headed by a former Republican Party donor in one of 
its pilot email voting system.
371
 Bush had become a controversial figure during his first term, and 
as a result, overseas registration for both parties drastically increased during his campaign for a 
second term. Before the election, FVAP was therefore overwhelmed by a flood of telephone 
calls, faxes and emails, which ended in the FVAP blocking its website to civilian overseas voters. 
Late primaries and legal challenges to Ralph Nader‟s appearance on the ballot delayed ballot 
mailing from a number of the battleground states and military and overseas civilians alike faced 
disenfranchisement. The difference was that while a million hard copies of the federal emergency 
write-in ballot had been sent to military based in Germany and Asia and the troops in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, two for every member of the military, embassies were turning down requests for the 
ballot from civilians because the stocks were empty. FVAP was further criticized for not 
providing an online version of the emergency ballot. In despair, Overseas Americans for Kerry 
posted their own online version on their websites with a disclaimer that no one knew if the allot 
would be accepted or not. Republicans Abroad then took the form and put it on their on website 
without the disclaimer. It later became clear, though, that no one could use that version. Overseas 
Americans for Kerry then sent 25,000 hardcopies of the emergency ballot to civilian voters in 
swing states, at their own expense, before the FVAP finally posted an official online version of it 
on its website. 
 Despite such problems facing civilian UOCAVA voters during the 2004 election, being 
associated with military voters might perhaps serve them well in the long run. The military is an 
uncontroversial group to support, and most voting reform initiatives in Congress have at least 
formally included civilian overseas voters. One might for instance wonder if there had been a 
MOVE Act if there had been no military voters overseas and only overseas civilians would 
benefit from it. In addition, since 2006, Congress has had its own Americans Abroad Caucus.
372
 
The Americans Abroad Caucus is a bi-partisan caucus designed at representing the interests of 
Americans living overseas, including voting rights. It has so far been chaired by Representative 
Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) and co-chaired by Joe Wilson (R-SC), and includes 27 other members, 
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so far, only from the House.
373
 Maloney explained to The New York Times that she represents a 
very international district, and that many of her constituents are part of the global economy.
374
 
South Carolina, in which Wilsons district lies, is also home to several fast-growing international 
businesses, as well as having a large number active and retired military people, many with 
overseas ties, according to The New York Times in 2007. In a letter to their colleagues on Capitol 
Hill, the two Representatives wrote that overseas Americans are “unofficial ambassadors” of the 
United States, playing an important role in “strengthening the U.S: economy, creating jobs in the 
United States, and extending American influence around the globe.”375 Maloney in particular, has 
introduced several bills to improve UOCAVA voting, and both have for instance actively 
attempted to correct problems faced by overseas citizens who keep bank accounts in the U.S., 
problems caused by stringent new banking regulations.
376
         
4.5 Continued Influence by New and Established Advocacy Groups 
Advocates outside Congress have continued to push for improved UOCAVA voting since the 
successful overseas Americans campaign in the late sixties to mid-seventies. While the Bipartisan 
Committee for Absentee Voting was dissolved when they reached their goal of achieving formal 
overseas voting rights in 1975, organizations such the Association of American Residents 
Overseas and the Federation of American Women‟s Clubs Overseas continued to lobby Congress 
for further improvements in voting rights. In 2011, the two latter organizations, the American 
Citizens Abroad, and a coalition of American Chambers of Commerce in North-Africa and the 
Middle-East (AmCham) organized the tenth annual Overseas Americans Week.
377
 Overseas 
Americans Week is a week-long “door-knocking” campaign were representatives of overseas 
Americans meet with legislators, their staffers and key government agencies and departments to 
discuss a variety of issues of interest to overseas Americans. The focus of the week varies from 
year to year. For instance, in 2006 and 2007, the Overseas Americans Week successfully worked 
to get an Americans Abroad Caucus established in Congress (see the previous subchapter), in 
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2009, the focus was the need for new voting rights legislation (this was before the MOVE Act), 
and in 2011 the focus was tax and banking problems.  
In 2008, more than 30 organizations representing military and overseas advocacy groups, 
elected officials, students and voting rights advocates formed the Alliance for Military and 
Overseas Voting Rights, which lobbies Congress.
378
 Included in the membership list is the Pew 
Center on the States, a non-profit organization that “identifies and advances effective solution to 
critical issues facing states.” The center conducts studies of states‟ UOCAVA voting practices 
and of UOCAVA citizens‟ voting problems. Also a member of the alliance is the Overseas 
Voting Foundation. It was founded after the 2004 FVAP failure to provide effective help to 
overseas civilians (as well as to members of the Uniformed Services.) It is a non-partisan, non-
profit organization that provides interactive, user-friendly voting assistance to UOCAVA voters. 
In 2007, even the National Defense Committee, a grass-root pro-military organization, urged the 
troops to use the Overseas Voting Foundation website to register in stead of the FVAP one, as 
they were not impressed by FVAP‟s track record.379 As previously discussed, the Overseas 
Voting Foundation also conducts UOCAVA election surveys, and tries to identify specific 
problems faced by overseas voters. Many of the reforms advocated by the Alliance for Military 
and Overseas Voting Rights, as well as reforms advocated by the FVAP, were included in the 
MOVE Act (including the use of internet technology in the voting process, allowing for a 
minimum of 45 days of ballot transit time, broaden the use of the federal write-in ballot, and 
eliminate notarization requirements.)
380
   
Though the Bipartisan Committee on Absentee Voting ceased to exist after the passage of 
the Overseas Voting Rights Act of 1975, Democrats Abroad and Republicans Abroad have 
continued to work to help overseas Americans vote. Democrats Abroad is the more active of the 
two, however, and as previously discussed, Republicans Abroad have been unclear about whether 
they supported the new federal legislation or not. Democrats Abroad has its own voter-assistance 
website called votefromaborad.org, applauded by Barak Obama.
381
 Also, in 2008, the Democratic 
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National Committee held its first global primary, in which overseas citizens, unlike other U.S. 
citizens, could vote over the internet. Earlier, overseas delegates have been chosen though 
caucuses. The Democrats Abroad delegation has eleven delegate votes at the party‟s national 
convention, and overseas voters can either vote for these delegates, or for their state‟s delegates. 
Democrats Abroad believe overseas interests are best promoted though having delegates 
specifically representing overseas interests at the convention. The Republicans Abroad have no 
similar system. 
4.6 Conclusion 
As this chapter has argued, the 2000 election raised awareness and interest in the problems of the 
states‟ election procedures for military and overseas voters. Academic literature dealing with 
these problems have begun to appear, and the Election Assistance Commission, the Pew Center 
on the States, and the Overseas Vote Foundation have since 2000 contributed with election 
surveys and reports examining UOCAVA voting in federal elections, thus adding to such efforts 
required of the Federal Voting Assistance Program by UOCAVA. Interest groups have been 
influential in the establishment of the Americans Abroad Caucus in Congress which is to give 
attention to a variety of areas of interest to overseas citizens, among which is the issue of voting 
rights. But it is perhaps the general support of the troops that has been most influential in 
persuading Congress to pass the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act in 2009, part of 
the defense authorization act for the following fiscal year. The MOVE Act requires that states use 
electronic means in the registration and ballot application process (though it does not require 
states to accept executed ballots over the internet.) There is still no reliable estimate of the size 
and “shape” of the overseas civilian vote, which might be a factor contributing to a relaxation in 
partisan tensions when it comes to amending UOCAVA (compared to tensions often present in 
other election reform discussions.) Because the MOVE Act was passed so recently, time is 
needed before its effect can be fully evaluated (and thus far, only the Overseas Vote Foundation 
has made available to the general public its survey of the 2010 congressional elections.) 
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Conclusion 
The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) is the present legal 
framework for absentee voting by military and overseas voters. It was passed in 1986, and 
merged legislation that had been in place since the 1950‟s and 1970‟s. Since 2000, interest in 
election regulations of voting by absentee military and overseas citizens has considerably 
increased among scholars and Congress alike. Studies have for instance shown that a significant 
number of military and overseas voters are disenfranchised because they receive their ballots too 
late. A study of absentee procedures and federal attempts at improving them therefore implies a 
study of voting rights. Academic literature relating to UOCAVA focus mostly on analyzing in 
detail the current problems facing voters covered by the act, and on technical solutions to such 
problems. Little attention has been given to the factors that have influenced U.S. policy 
discussions concerning the voting rights of military and overseas citizens (other than the fact that 
procedural improvements are needed,) and certainly, little attention has been given to such factors 
in a historical perspective.
382
 This thesis has attempted to fill that gap by answering the following 
question: What factors have hindered or encouraged change in U.S. policy concerning the 
absentee voting rights of members of the uniformed services, their spouses and dependents 
accompanying them, and overseas citizens, from the 1940‟s to the present? The thesis also 
addresses the questions of how policy has changed and how successful these changes have been 
at enfranchising these groups of citizens.  
  One factor that has had a significant influence on U.S. policy debates concerning the 
(absentee) voting rights of military and overseas citizens is the issue of states‟ rights. In the 
1940‟s, when Congress first began discussing how to help members of the military vote absentee, 
state control of the franchise was regarded as one of the most important rights of the states. Or, as 
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Herbert Wechsler puts it, it was a “period when state control of the electoral franchise was felt to 
be a first principle in American law and politics.”383 Many feared that federal legislation 
guaranteeing the voting rights of soldiers would set a precedent for further federal “intrusion” 
into the affairs of the states. In particular, Democrats representing the white South feared that 
such action would represent the first step to unraveling the systemic discrimination of African 
Americans in voting processes (and in other arenas.) The bills that resulted in the Soldier Voting 
Act of 1942 not only guaranteed the right to vote absentee, but also waived poll tax requirements. 
The debates relating to the bills therefore contained many of the same arguments over state and 
federal powers used in the general poll tax repeal debates. Both issues centered on whether the 
relevant federal legislation involved election regulation, a power designated to Congress by the 
Constitution, or the setting of voter qualifications, a power designated to the states by the 
Constitution. The Soldier Voting Act waived the poll tax for members of the military, but the 
general public had to wait for the Twenty-fourth Amendment of 1964. Proponents of the act had 
in the end relied on the argument that in time of war, Congress had the obligation to prevent that 
that voters were disenfranchised because of military service in time of war. The act would not be 
valid in time of peace, and opponents managed in 1944 to water down proposed amendments to 
the act to such an extent that there was uncertainty about whether the amended act had become 
less effective than before. In the 1944 election, 50 percent of members of the uniformed services 
(of voting age) applied for ballots, but only 30 percent had their ballots counted. 
 States‟ rights concerns continued to temper federal efforts at enfranchising service 
personnel in the next two decades. The Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955 actually withdrew 
the federal guarantee and instead listed a number of state recommendations, though the 
withdrawal had little significance since the state procedures were inadequate. Theoretical voting 
rights had then little meaning to someone trying to cast a ballot. In the 1970‟s, states‟ rights 
concerns were still present in the debates regarding the voting rights of overseas civilians. By 
then, however, restrictions to the franchise had been removed one after the other, by the Voting 
Rights Act and its amendments, by court rulings, and by constitutional amendments. Federal 
legislation regarding the absentee voting rights of service personnel or overseas civilians no 
longer posed the threat of setting a precedent for the enfranchisement of African Americans or for 
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federal involvement in election processes. Renewed commitment to democratic ideals after the 
war against Nazism and the ongoing Cold War against communism had made restrictions to the 
franchise harder to tolerate, and voting rights had become a national concern. As the polls 
became open to more and more Americans, overseas civilians seized the opportunity to demand 
to not be treated as “second class citizens” and to demand the rights that the Supreme Court had 
in the past decades found to represent a core constitutional value.
384
 The Overseas Citizens 
Voting Rights Act of 1975 and its 1978 amendment guaranteed the absentee voting rights of 
overseas citizens and of members of the uniformed services (overseas and in the U.S.) The 
Justice Department has filed a number of law suits against states that violated the Overseas 
Citizens Voting Rights Act and that violate the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 
Voting Act which replaced it. One of those states was Florida which did not allow overseas 
voters enough time to return ballots to the state in time for Election Day. Because Florida did not 
introduce appropriate measures to allow more time, the state entered into a consent decree with 
the Justice Department that would allow UOCAVA votes that arrived up to ten days after the 
election to be counted. This situation continued and put its stamp on the 2000 election, as 
discussed in chapter four. 
 States‟ rights continue to color election reform debates in Congress. The discussion over 
qualification versus regulation is still omnipresent. After 2000, for instance, bills introduced to 
enfranchise ex-felons have not passed, as opponents argue that it would be an infringement on 
state powers to set voter qualifications (whatever their ulterior motives are.) However, the 
General Accounting Office categorizes UOCAVA under federal powers to regulate elections, as 
does the Congressional Research Service (which had testified to the unconstitutionality of the 
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act in the 1970‟s.) UOCAVA has furthermore been upheld by 
federal courts, and no case seems to have reached the Supreme Court.
385
 Congress continues to 
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amend UOCAVA by setting new state requirements. The Military and Overseas Empowerment 
Act which requires that states provide electronic means in the registration and ballot request 
process (except for requiring that states accept executed ballots by electronic means,) passed with 
little controversy in 2009.
386
 Election reports on voting by UOCAVA citizens in the 2008 
election indicated that procedural problems still remain, including the problem that voters receive 
their ballots too late. Time will tell if the MOVE Act will help solve such problems. 
 Partisan politics and presidential involvement have also been important factors 
influencing policy debates concerning absentee voting rights of military and overseas citizens. In 
1943, Gallup polls indicated that the military vote in the 1944 federal elections would favor the 
Democrats and the sitting president, the commander-in-chief. This prognosis became especially 
significant as the presidential election was suspected to be very close, and the military vote could 
potentially determine that election. The policy debates became divided between Republicans and 
Southern states‟ rights Democrats who favored weak or no federal absentee legislation at all, and 
Northern Democrats who wanted strong federal legislation. The New York Times argued, 
however, that the Republican opposition was stronger than the opposition of Southern states‟ 
rights Democrats.
387
 Roosevelt addressed Congress and said that voting for the states‟ rights plan 
(the weak federal legislation) would deprive members of the military of the vote and that the 
states‟ rights plan was even “a fraud on the American people.”388 Roosevelt‟s motivation for 
involving himself in the issue was undoubtedly (at least partly) due to his ambition of winning 
the close election, just like Lincoln‟s motivation for encouraging the Union states to pass 
absentee voting legislation for servicemen during the Civil War. Roosevelt‟s message to 
Congress caused a great deal of controversy. It made opponents of the federal plan, including 
opponents who seemed to be wavering, even more convinced that the federal plan bills were 
simply new attempts by New Deal and Roosevelt supporters to concentrate power at the federal 
level and to get Roosevelt reelected. On the other hand, Roosevelt‟s message signaled to the 
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American electorate that opponents of federal legislation were punishing the soldiers, something 
that made justifying opposing federal legislation even harder. It is therefore unclear whether 
Roosevelt‟s involvement encouraged or discouraged the passing of a federal plan. In any case, 
the compromise bill that was passed in the end seems to have weakened the Soldier Voting Act, 
and newspapers believed there was a real chance the president would veto it. He did not, but the 
bill became law without his signature. 
    In the debates during the 1950‟s, partisan tensions seem to have eased, probably 
because a Republican president was encouraging Congress to act on the problem of 
disenfranchised absentee members of the armed services. When Congress passed the Federal 
Voting Assistance Act in 1955, the commander-in-chief (who often benefit from the military 
vote) was Republican, and in any case, fewer military votes were at stake. Though states‟ rights 
concerns prevented the act of 1955 to set mandatory state requirements, it did set the stage for 
further federal action, as it established permanent federal responsibilities for encouraging states to 
change their laws, and for helping military voters navigate through complex state absentee voting 
processes, and for lobbying Congress for new legislation. 
 Since the debates concerning the voting rights of overseas civilian started in the late 
1960‟s, absentee voting legislation covering the groups now included in UOCAVA do not seem 
to have been hindered by partisan politics. In fact, partisan considerations might even have 
encouraged federal action. For the size and political leaning of the overseas vote is not known. 
This has lead both Democrats and Republicans to claim they have an edge in the overseas vote. 
As for presidential involvement sine Eisenhower, it has at least not been as public. While Nixon 
does not seem to have given any personal comments on the federal bills proposed to enfranchise 
overseas civilians, his Department of Justice was very much opposed to it, and it is likely that the 
department reflected Nixon‟s views. According to Eugene Marans, Antonin Scalia of the Justice 
Department, in particular, posed a real threat to the success of the Overseas Citizens Voting 
Rights Act.
389
 According to the Association of American Residents Abroad, Barack Obama is in 
general in favor of federal initiatives to improve the voting situation for UOCAVA citizens, but 
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no evidence is available that suggest that he has been directly involved in the efforts to amend 
UOCAVA.
390
    
 Fear of fraud has always been present in debates over military and overseas voting. In the 
1940‟s, for instance, there were arguments that the proposed federal ballot commission could 
become too powerful and political and that this might reflect in their handling of ballots. In the 
1970‟s, some argued that enfranchising overseas civilians would involve dangers of fraud 
because it was difficult for states to check if a voter who no longer had an address in a particular 
voting district did not also vote in other states. In the 1940‟s, the ballot commission only got 
limited responsibilities and would be dissolved once the war ended. But in the 1970‟s, the fear of 
fraud did not stop the bill that guaranteed overseas citizens the right to vote even if they did not 
maintain a place of abode in any state. In 2009, fear of fraud set its marks on the Military and 
Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act, but not to the same degree that the fear of fraud and 
partisan tensions have been obstacles to other election reforms since the 2000 presidential 
election debacle, it seems. In fact, the National Journal, for instance, wrote in 2009 that “The 
law‟s advocates overcame the partisan splits that typically bog down election reform by stepping 
back from disputes over states‟ rights versus voter fraud and taking what Chaplin [the director of 
the election initiatives for the Pew Center on the States] calls “the 90-degree walk around the 
problem”.” The 90-degree walk that Chaplin referred to was the fact that the MOVE Act, as 
already mentioned, requires that states use electronic methods in the registration and election 
process except for accepting executed ballots. 
 Popular opinion has also influenced the policy debates relevant to this thesis, as already 
indicated. In the 1940‟s, popular support of the troops made opposing federal legislation difficult. 
In the 1970‟s, the lack of interest in the voting rights of overseas civilians by both the general 
public and by members of Congress seems to have been one of the most important factors 
hindering legislation covering overseas civilians from passing. Interest in UOCAVA voters was 
significantly increased among scholars and in Congress after the 2000 elections. A 2008 opinion 
poll ordered by the Pew Center on the States suggests that “the vast majority of Americans 
support having a uniform set of rules for military and overseas voter.”391 However, improving 
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UOCAVA is easy more because of the military component associated with the act than the 
civilian component. Nonetheless, since 2006, Congress houses an Americans Abroad Caucus 
dedicated to issues of concern to overseas citizens. 
 The efforts of overseas Americans seem to have been critical to getting a bill passed 
through Congress in the 1970‟s. Such efforts raised awareness of the voting problems faced by 
overseas citizens and convinced Congress the overseas Americans were interested in and affected 
by American politics. According to the Andrew Ellis, the U.S. stands out as one of few countries 
in which overseas voting rights have been granted in response to demands by Americans residing 
abroad.
392
 Military and overseas interest groups continue to lobby for the improvement of 
election processes that affect such voters. 
 There is still no constitutional right to vote in the U.S. Though the franchise is linked to 
citizenship, this link is not absolute. Therefore, the voting rights of overseas citizens, especially 
civilians who might have no intention of ever returning, is perhaps not self evident. Looking to 
other democracies, not all have as liberal laws covering overseas civilians as the U.S. While 
voting from abroad is allowed by 115 countries (in 2007,) limits to overseas voting rights include 
restrictions relating to time spent abroad, and restrictions relating to reasons for residing 
abroad.
393
 Canada restricts voting from abroad to five years after leaving the country, Germany 
sets the limit to twenty-five years, and Australia sets the limit to six years.
394
 In the past decade, 
the United Kingdom even reduced its time limit from twenty years to fifteen years.
395
 Denmark 
(at least in 2003) restricts voting from abroad to employees of Danish companies and the Danish 
government, students, and those who live abroad for health reasons.
396
 One strong argument for 
not limiting the time period for voting for American residents abroad is perhaps the fact that they 
are liable to (federal) taxation, unlike the overseas nationals of many other countries. In any case, 
judging by the recent amendments to UOCAVA, the voting rights of American overseas citizens, 
regardless of their length of absence, are here to stay. 
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